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I. INTRODUCTION
ERHAPS no other employment-related issue has attracted more
public attention in recent years than workplace privacy. More than
ever before, employers, driven by the desire to ensure worker pro-
ductivity and the need to guard against legal liability, find themselves
compelled to probe deeply into the backgrounds, qualifications, and
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mental make-up of current and potential employees to evaluate their
suitability for employment and to assure their continued reliability on the
job.' All the while, workers are developing an increasingly sophisticated
understanding of their legal and moral rights, and disputes over the ex-
tent of the employee's prerogative to remain free from employer probing
and surveillance are steadily gaining in frequency.2 Persistent media cov-
erage of the dispute over workplace privacy, in turn, has brought the issue
sharply into focus. The resulting tension between the employer's need to
know and the employee's interest in maintaining an impenetrable sphere
of privacy 3 has become the subject of a pervasive public and legal dis-
course that is likely to preoccupy courts and legislatures for years to
come.
Though not directly concerned with privacy law, this Comment ad-
dresses one privacy issue that has recently come to the forefront, namely,
the appropriateness of assessing job applicants' integrity by means of
1. See KURT H. DECKER, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE 11 (1987). These
concerns are no doubt legitimate. Employers most certainly have an interest in maintain-
ing a productive, loyal, honest and dependable work force, particularly since the estimated
cost of employee drug use and theft alone amounts to billions of dollars each year. See L.
CAMILLE HtBERT, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW § 1:02, at 5 (1993). Employers are also in-
"creasingly becoming subject to substantial potential liability for hiring and retaining dan-
gerous employees, if they knew or should have known of the employee's dangerous
propensities and the employee in fact caused harm to a third party. For a detailed discus-
sion of negligent hiring, see part V.B. infra; see also Michael Silver, Negligent Hiring
Claims Take Off, A.B.A. J., May 1987, at 72 (indicating that, though of recent origin, negli-
gent hiring is a rapidly expanding tort that is now a recognized cause of action in most
states). Significantly, concerns related to employee violence have come to the forefront in
recent years. See Workplace Violence: Employers Apprised of Legal Problems Coming
from Efforts to Stem Violence, Gov'r EMPLOYEE REL. REP. (BNA), Feb. 21, 1994, avail-
able in WESTLAW, BNA-LB Database, 32 GERR 232, 1994. According to one report, ap-
proximately two million persons were attacked at work during 1993, while six million were
threatened and sixteen million were subject to harassment. Workplace Violence: Workshop
on Safe Workplaces Alerts Employers to Legal Problems Involved, GOV'T EMPLOYEE REL.
REP. (BNA), May 9, 1994, available in WESTLAW, BNA-LB Database, 32 GERR 597, 1994.
Homicide, in turn, "has become the leading cause of workplace death." Employee Privacy
Issues Can Affect All Areas of Employment, Attorney Says, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Dec.
13, 1993, available in WESTLAW, BNA-LB Database, 1993 DLR 237 d1I, 1993. Yet,
although employers thus clearly have valid reasons for using caution in the selection and
supervision of employees, the question remains whether the particular methods chosen are
effective, appropriate and justified. It is these concerns that have become the focal point of
the public discourse regarding workplace privacy.
2. See Employee Privacy Issues Can Affect All Areas of Employment, Attorney Says,
supra note 1 ("[e]mployees [now] are much more willing to challenge their employer and
sue to protect their rights").
3. In stressing the importance of an employee's right to privacy, Hdbert describes
privacy in the following manner:
The right to privacy is about dignity-not subjecting individuals to proce-
dures that probe the secrets of their minds and bodies and to inquiries into
areas of their life that they are entitled to keep to themselves. The right to
privacy is about autonomy-allowing individuals to make their own choices
about fundamental aspects of their lives. The right to privacy is about indi-
viduality, because the essence of individuality is the right to make one's own
decisions about how to lead one's life; the different choices that we make are
what makes us individuals.
HtBERT, supra note 1, § 1:04, at 13.
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written, paper-and-pencil "honesty tests."' 4 In particular, the analysis fo-
cuses on the nature of the privacy debate as it unfolds in the honesty
testing context by discussing the business of honesty testing (Part II); ex-
isting legal limitations on the use of honesty testing (Part III); the current
state of research regarding the efficacy and validity of integrity tests (Part
IV);5 and the justifications advanced for corporate reliance on integrity
tests in the employment context (Part V). Part VI raises some social and
ethical concerns implicit in the practice of honesty testing, while Part VII
sets forth proposed alternatives for regulation.
II. THE BUSINESS OF HONESTY TESTING
The past few decades have seen a rapid rise in the number of busi-
nesses that rely on various types of honesty testing as a method of screen-
ing potential, and at times present, employees. 6 The trend began in the
1960s and 1970s when employers, apart from conducting general back-
ground investigations of job applicants, turned to polygraph examinations
as a preferred means of eliminating apparently dishonest individuals from
the applicant pool.7 With the passage of the Employee Polygraph Protec-
tion Act of 1988,8 which prohibits the use of this screening device for
most private employers, many companies have come to rely on so-called
paper-and-pencil integrity tests as an alternative for identifying dishonest
or "counterproductive" workers.9 Approximately five to six thousand
4. Although one early honesty test developed for use by the military dates back to
1942, the overwhelming majority of tests have been published since the mid-1970s. Philip
Ash, A History of Honesty Testing, in PREEMPLOYMENT HONESTY TESTING 3, 12-14 (John
W. Jones ed., 1991). Employer reliance on written integrity tests for purposes of screening
employees is thus a very recent phenomenon.
5. The terms "integrity test" and "honesty test" are used synonymously in this
comment.
6. Pre-employment testing in general appears to be on the rise. As one scholar
reports:
The American Society for Personnel Administration found 39% of 360 com-
panies surveyed were testing more in 1985 than in 1980, and 44% were con-
sidering even more testing. A 1988 survey of 245 human resource executives
by the Bureau of National Affairs (a publisher) found that 63% of surveyed
companies ask applicants to supply work samples or take performance tests,
while 30% require ability tests, and 25% test for job knowledge.
Lawrence M. Rudner, Pre-Employment Testing and Employee Productivity, PUB. PERSON-
NEL MGMrr., Summer 1992, at 133. The same author cautions:
While testing can lead to increased productivity, there is little to indicate that
companies can properly implement a testing program or evaluate its effec-
tiveness. Many reputable test publishers quickly point out that the average
consumer places too much value on testing. At best, tests only estimate a
person's ability or the extent to which a person possesses some attribute.
Tests should only be used to enhance an employment decision. Too often,
test results are treated as scientific evidence and totally replace professional
judgment in making decisions.
Id. at 134 (internal citations omitted).
7. R. MICHAEL O'BANNON ET AL., HONESTY AND INTEGRITY TESTING 1 (1989).
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988).
9. Joseph W. Ambash, Honesty, Personality and Psychological Testing in the Employ-
ment Context, 1990 WL 357776, at *2 (July 1990). Although at least 46 individual honesty
tests are currently available, see Ash, supra note 4, at 14, the lion's share of the honesty test
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employers now administer as many as five to seven million honesty tests
to prospective employees each year.10 The trend toward increasing de-
pendence upon honesty testing, moreover, apparently continues un-
abated: a 1992 Ernst & Young survey of retail executives found that forty-
seven percent of respondents had used paper-and-pencil honesty tests in
1990, and that nineteen percent of retailers intended to implement hon-
esty testing in the future." It has been estimated that the integrity test
business is now growing at an annual rate of twenty percent. 12
Honesty test marketers claim that, by measuring employee "honesty"
(and occasionally such other constructs as violent tendencies or drug use),
these tests allow employers to obtain accurate attitudinal profiles of test
takers.' 3 As a result, they argue, employers should be in a better position
to identify persons who are likely to engage in theft or, more generally,
"counterproductive behavior" in the workplace. 14 Honesty tests may be
roughly classified as belonging in either of two separate categories. The
first group comprises those tests characterized as "overt" because they
rely upon straightforward questions regarding subjects' attitudes toward
dishonesty and past instances of dishonest conduct. 15 These tests are
based upon the presumption that honest individuals regard dishonesty as
unusual behavior deserving punishment, while dishonest persons consider
dishonesty to represent the status quo. 16 Examples of overt questions
include the following:
* "How often do you tell the truth?"
" "Do you think that you are too honest to take something that is
not yours?"
" "How much do you dislike doing what someone tells you to do?"
* "Do you feel guilty when you do something you should not do?"
" "Do you think it is stealing to take small items home from
work?"
market has been captured by three measures: the Reid Report (Brooks & Arnold, 1989),
the Personnel Selection Inventory (PSI; London House, 1987), and the Stanton Survey
(Reed, 1982). Stephen J. Guastello & Mark L. Rieke, A Review and Critique of Honesty
Test Research, 9 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 501, 501-02 (1991).
10. HtBERT, supra note 1, § 7:02, at 8. Honesty tests are attractive because they are
easily administered and inexpensive. The cost of an honesty test typically ranges from $7
to $30 per copy, far below the price of a polygraph examination. See id.
11. The Ernst & Young/IMRA Survey of Retail Loss Prevention Trends, CHAIN STORE
AGE EXECUTIVE, Jan. 1992, § 2, at 22, 56 [hereinafter Ernst & Young Survey].
12. H. John Bernardin & Donna K. Cooke, Validity of an Honesty Test in Predicting
Theft Among Convenience Store Employees, 36 ACAD. MGMrT. J. 1097, 1097 (1993). Given
this explosive growth, it should be of considerable concern that the testing industry re-
mains largely unregulated. As one author aptly remarks, "test publishers are given credit
when their products support sound employment decisions, and they are usually held harm-
less when employers make wrong decisions on the basis of tests." Rudner, supra note 6, at
145. Nevertheless, as seen below, few efforts at regulation have been undertaken.
13. Kurt H. Decker, Honesty Tests-A New Form of Polygraph?, 4 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J.
141, 145 (1986).
14. HCBERT, supra note 1, § 7:01, at 3-4.
15. Id.
16. Id. § 7:01, at 6.
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* "What percentage of the people you know are so honest they
wouldn't steal at all?"
• "How easy is it to get away with stealing?"
* "Do you believe most employers take advantage of the people
who work for them?"'17
The second type of integrity test marketed by test publishers-gener-
ally known as the "veiled purpose" or "personality-based"-seeks to
identify dishonest propensities by eliciting, in a disguised fashion, atti-
tudes considered to correlate in some manner with honesty.'8 Such tests
may ask questions similar to those listed below:
• "True or False: Eating right is important to my health."
* "True or False: I like to take chances."
* "On the average, how often during the week do you go to
parties?"
* "I feel lonely even when I am with other people [all of the time,
most of the time, sometimes, almost never, never]."
* "How often do you blush?"
* "How often do you make your bed [every day, never, etc.]?"'19
The lines between these tests are gradually becoming blurred, however,
as newly developed measures of honesty are coming to rely on an increas-
ingly broader range of reported attitudes and behaviors.20 Furthermore,
growing numbers of test publishers are broadening the behaviors these
tests were designed to predict by including all forms of "counterproduc-
tive behavior" along with the traditional construct of "theft. '21 Never-
theless, according to O'Bannon et al., most honesty tests will include
items from any or all of four general categories of inquiry: (1) admissions
of illegal or disapproved activities; (2) opinions regarding illegal or disap-
proved behavior; (3) descriptions of one's own personality and thought
patterns; and (4) reactions to hypothetical situations.22 Since few test
publishers make their scoring keys available, the relevance of each of
these items to the overall test result cannot easily be determined in any
given instance. 23 Each item, however, is based upon a distinct rationale.
Thus, test developers rely upon the fact that a significant number of job
applicants readily confess prior illegal conduct when asked to do so on
integrity tests, so that questions seeking theft admissions and the like do
17. These sample questions are listed in UNITED STATES CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECH-
NOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THm USE OF INTEGRITY TESTS FOR PRE-EMPLOYMENT SCREENING
31-32 (1990) [hereinafter OTA REPORT]. The authors note that the questions have been
changed slightly from the format in which they appear in actual integrity tests in order to
avoid proprietary disclosures. Id. at 31 n.27.
18. HBERT, supra note 1, § 7:01, at 5. Competition between open and veiled-purpose
integrity tests has surfaced only in the past few years. Since the predictive value of person-
ality-type measures tends to be lower than that of clear-purpose tests, and since the latter
also rest on a significantly larger research base, it is predicted that clear-purpose tests will
retain a dominant market share. Ash, supra note 4, at 9.
19. OTA REPORT, supra note 17, at 32.
20. Id. at 32-33.
21. Id. at 33.
22. O'BANNON ET AL., supra note 7, at 17-18.
23. Id. at 18.
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elicit valid results. 24 Second, based upon research showing that offenders
display certain attitudes that distinguish them from non-offenders, test
publishers assume that opinions regarding illegal behavior will prove in-
dicative of deviant tendencies among test takers. 25 Self-assessments of
personality and thought patterns, in turn, are considered useful in re-
vealing attitudes-such as risk taking, personal alienation, and impulsiv-
ity-that are thought to correlate with dishonest behavior.26 Finally,
questions that seek to elicit reactions to hypothetical situations are aimed
at reaching an assessment of the subject's degree of disapproval of dis-
honest conduct. 27
Integrity tests, then, not only require the examinee to reveal highly per-
sonal information but also may have potentially far-reaching conse-
quences should the results of an honesty test determine a test taker to be
"dishonest." Given their invasive nature, it might be expected that hon-
esty testing, as a preemployment selection device, would be subject to
some degree of regulation. This, however, is not the case. Indeed, an
American Psychological Association Task Force Report on the status of
integrity testing cautioned against prohibition of honesty testing and
merely recommended that test publishers adhere to existing standards
and guidelines. 28 At the same time, neither federal nor, for the most part,
state law restricts or regulates honesty testing (whether it be in terms of
test development, test marketing, or test administration, or regarding
subsequent use of test results). What is more, courts have generally held
that the practice of integrity testing does not violate any private rights of
employees. 29
III. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO
HONESTY TESTING
In 1988, Congress passed the Employee Polygraph Protection Act
(EPPA), 30 which proscribes the use of polygraphs and similar devices by
most private-sector employers for purposes of measuring the honesty of
both current and potential employees.31 An estimated eighty-five per-
cent of all polygraph tests previously administered by U.S. employers are
now prohibited under the EPPA.32 However, the Act's prohibition ex-
24. Id.
25. Id. at 19.
26. Id. at 19-20.
27. Id. at 20.
28. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, QUESTIONNAIRES USED IN THE PRE-
DICTION OF TRUSTWORTHINESS IN PRE-EMPLOYMENT SELECTION DECISIONS: AN A.P.A.
TASK FORCE REPORT 26 (1991) [hereinafter APA REPORT]. The APA Task Force's con-
clusions and recommendations are discussed in greater detail infra in Parts IV and VI.
29. See infra Part III.
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988).
31. Id. § 2001(3).
32. Anne E. Libbin et al., Employee Medical and Honesty Testing, PERSONNEL, Nov.
1988, at 38, 47. The EPPA does not preempt more restrictive state or local laws that regu-
late polygraph testing. Id. at 48. More than twenty states have independently passed legis-
lation regulating polygraph examinations. Id. In some cases, state laws proscribe the use of
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pressly does not extend to written paper-and-pencil tests; indeed, an ear-
lier draft of the bill that would have incorporated written honesty
examinations among the range of testing devices made unlawful by this
legislation was subsequently deleted.33 Passage of the EPPA therefore
has provided private businesses with a powerful incentive to resort to
other methods of screening job applicants.34 Most likely because of the
marked similarities in both approach and purpose, employers have come
to rely heavily upon the use of written integrity tests which, like the poly-
graph, explicitly strive to ascertain employee trustworthiness.
In light of the fact that honesty tests provide a convenient replacement
for the previously popular polygraph examination, at least one commen-
tator has proposed that such tests should be regarded as substitute
polygraphs and hence be regulated under existing polygraph statutes.35
The author observes that polygraph examinations not only have served as
models for the development of integrity tests but are frequently em-
ployed as backdrops against which the latter are measured. 36 Further-
more, the author argues, they could well be considered to fit within the
"spirit" and "intent" of specific state polygraph statutes.37 In fact, a sub-
stantial number of states had passed statutes prohibiting use of polygraph
examinations prior to the enactment of the EPPA.38 In many instances,
these statutes can be read broadly to ban written integrity tests as well,
since they prohibit not only polygraphs and lie detectors, but also "simi-
lar" tests or devices. 39 Notwithstanding this potential for flexibility in in-
all polygraphs by private employers; other states prohibit employers from requiring such
tests, establish licensing standards for polygraph examiners, or impose other restrictions.
Id.
33. H8BERT, supra note 1, § 7:08, at 29. The EPPA defines "lie detector" as "a poly-
graph, deceptograph, voice stress analyzer, psychological stress evaluator, or any other
similar device (whether mechanical or electrical) that is used, or the results of which are
used, for the purpose of rendering a diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty or dishonesty
of an individual." 29 U.S.C. § 2001(3). The House Conference Report, moreover, explic-
itly states that written or oral honesty tests are not intended to be included within the
definition of "lie detector." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 659, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 749, 750. "In deciding to strike the language from the defi-
nition, the Committee concludes that this issue should be handled separately from the lie
detector." H.R. REP. No. 208, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1987).
34. Ambash, supra note 9.
35. See Decker, supra note 13, at 141-43.
36. Id. at 143.
37. Id. at 149. In a not entirely convincing fashion, Decker argues that, since paper-
and-pencil honesty tests are normally scored mechanically, they could be regarded as en-
compassed by prohibitions against "mechanical lie detector" tests such as those contained
in Pennsylvania's polygraph statute. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7321 (1983). More-
over, he suggests, honesty tests should be treated like polygraphs because the tests aim to
evaluate the same subjects. Decker, supra note 13, at 149.
38. See Decker, supra note 13, at 142 (24 states had enacted legislation prohibiting
polygraph examinations by employers by the year 1985; various others required polygraph
operators to be licensed).
39. See Kenneth E. Bemis IV, Comment, Prohibition of Pencil and Paper Honesty
Tests: Is Honesty the Best Policy?, 25 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 571, 586 (1989). Examples of
statutes employing the phrase "similar test or examination" are CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2
(West 1989); MD. CODE ANN., LABOR & EMPLY. § 3-102 (1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 704 (1985). Other states that have broadly worded polygraph statutes include Alaska,
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terpretation, courts to date have refrained from applying such a broad
statutory construction, and the few jurisdictions that have expressly ad-
dressed the issue have favored a narrow reading of the statutory prohibi-
tion. The Minnesota polygraph statute, for example, states that "[n]o
employer or agent thereof shall directly or indirectly solicit or require a
polygraph, voice stress analysis, or any test purporting to test the honesty
of any employee or prospective employee."'40 Despite the fact that this
language could easily be regarded to extend to paper-and-pencil honesty
tests, the Minnesota Supreme Court held otherwise. In State v. Century
Camera, Inc.,41 the court-concerned that the phrase "any test purport-
ing to test honesty" was unconstitutionally vague-narrowly interpreted
the statutory provision to apply solely to those testing devices that mea-
sure physiological changes and to exclude written examinations.42
A similar conclusion was recently reached by the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals in Pluskota v. Roadrunner Freight Systems, Inc. 43 regarding a
similar provision of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act."n The Wiscon-
sin statute provided that "[n]o employer ... may directly or indirectly
solicit, require or administer a polygraph, voice stress analysis, psycholog-
ical stress evaluator or any other similar test purporting to test the hon-
esty of any employee or prospective employee. '45 The plaintiff in
Pluskota alleged that he was terminated by Roadrunner after having
been forced, under threat of termination, to take an unfair honesty test
(the paper-and-pencil "CompuScreen II") in violation of the statute. He
expressly contended that the "similar test" language effectively included
written honesty tests within the scope of the statute. 46 The court dis-
agreed. Applying rules of statutory construction (in particular, ejusdem
generis), the court concluded that the reference to "similar tests" was re-
Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington, and
Wisconsin. See O'BANNON ET AL., supra note 7, at 113.
40. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.75(1) (West 1993) (emphasis added).
41. 309 N.W.2d 735, 745 (Minn. 1981).
42. Id. ("[W]e exclude from the current prohibitions of section 181.75 written psycho-
logical questionnaires, personal judgments made by an employer or his or her agent, even
if based in part on observations of physical behavior or demeanor, and all other gauges of
honesty which do not purport to measure physiological changes.").
43. 524 N.W.2d 904 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
44. WIs. STAT. §§ 111.31-.395 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
45. WIS. STAT. § 111.37(1)(b) (1988). The Wisconsin legislature amended § 111.37 in
1991 to provide that "no employer may ... [d]irectly or indirectly require, request, suggest
or cause an employee or prospective employee to take or submit to a lie detector test."
Wis. STAT. § 111.37(2) (Supp. 1994).
46. Roadrunner required all dock area workers to take the CompuScreen II after
stereo equipment was reported stolen from the dock area of its warehouse. Pluskota ini-
tially refused to take the test under threat of termination and was suspended. He later
returned to work and submitted to the test after being assured that it was a job require-
ment. Although his test results were "unremarkable" and the theft was determined not to
have been the work of insiders, Pluskota was terminated one month later on grounds of




stricted to tests that, like those enumerated, measure physiological
responses.47
On a broader scale, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in Heins v.
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review48 expressly endorsed the
practice of administering workplace honesty exams on the grounds that
"employee honesty is a genuine and job-related concern for an em-
ployer. ''49 At issue in Heins was an administrative board order denying a
former employee unemployment compensation benefits because of his
refusal to take a paper-and-pencil honesty test.50 Since the employee had
not challenged the permissibility of honesty testing under the state's poly-
graph statute,51 the court did not have occasion to address this question;
however, its finding that the employer acted reasonably in asking the
claimant to submit to an honesty exam52 strongly suggests that the Penn-
sylvania statute, like its Minnesota counterpart, is to be narrowly
construed.
Currently, only two state statutes explicitly prohibit or restrict the use
of employee integrity tests in any significant way. Honesty testing has
been entirely banned as an employee screening device in Massachu-
setts.53 Massachusetts, by statute, makes it unlawful for any employer to
require a job applicant or current employee to take a "lie detector test," a
term which is defined as
any test utilizing a polygraph or any other device, mechanism, instru-
ment or written examination, which is operated, or the results of
47. Pluskota, 524 N.W.2d at 906-07. Under the rule of ejusdem generis, the meaning
of "any similar test" must be limited to tests similar to a "polygraph, voice stress analysis,
[or] psychological stress evaluator." Id. at 907. It is important to note, however, that the
court found support in the statute's legislative history: the bill was amended to add the
word "similar" between "other" and "test" upon the specific recommendation of repre-
sentatives of the testing industry that it be made clear that the statute should be applied
only to tests that measure physiological changes. Id. at 907-08. The exact wording of the
statutory provision can thus be of critical importance in determining the scope of the statu-
tory prohibition.
48. 534 A.2d 592 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
49. Id. at 594.
50. The court interpreted Heins' complaint to state that he had good cause for refusing
to take the Reid honesty test because it was an unreasonable intrusion. Id. at 593. Noting
that "an employee's privacy rights must be weighed against an employer's legitimate desire
to prevent theft," the court rejected Heins' claim on the grounds that the employer had
articulated a legitimate reason-ensuring the honesty of its employees-and that the Un-
employment Compensation Board's findings that the employer's request was reasonable
rested on substantial evidence: the test was given to all employees, was only one factor
used in assessing honesty, and was not given with the purpose of harassing Heins. Id. at
594. Because of the particular circumstances of Heins, which involved a refusal to take an
honesty test and which placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove that his refusal was
reasonable, id. at 595, the degree to which the court's reasoning may be applied in other
contexts is not altogether clear. It does, however, indicate that courts may not be readily
inclined, absent statutory prohibition, to impose limitations on employers' use of integrity
tests.
51. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7321 (1983). The statute prohibits "mechanical lie de-
tector tests" which, according to Decker, could be construed liberally to encompass
mechanically scored integrity tests. See Decker, supra note 13, at 149.
52. Heins, 534 A.2d at 595.
53. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 19B (West 1989).
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which are used or interpreted by an examiner for the purpose of pur-
porting to assist in or enable the detection of deception, the verifica-
tion of truthfulness, or the rendering of a diagnostic opinion
regarding the honesty of an individual.54
By including written examinations in the statutory definition of lie detec-
tor tests, the Massachusetts statute evinces a clear intent to prohibit all
forms of integrity testing.
Rhode Island also has imposed statutory limitations upon employers'
use of honesty testing. The Rhode Island statute employs a definition of
"lie detector test" identical to that used by Massachusetts 55 and generally
prohibits employers from requesting, requiring, or subjecting any em-
ployee to a lie detector test as a condition of employment. 56 The statute,
however, contains the further proviso that written examinations may be
used if their results do not form the primary basis for an employment
decision.57
Legislative efforts in other states to expand the scope of polygraph stat-
utes to include paper-and-pencil honesty testing have largely failed.
Thus, Bemis reports in some detail on efforts to amend Oregon's poly-
graph statute to prohibit written honesty tests.58 These proposed amend-
ments were eventually tabled,59 and to date no such changes appear in
the Oregon statute.60 Similarly, a proposal by the New York Attorney
General to make employer-mandated integrity testing illegal 61 has yet to
appear in statutory form.
At the same time, despite the fact that honesty tests are intuitively per-
ceived by many as an invasion of the test taker's right to privacy, constitu-
tional privacy protections are not likely to extend to the great majority of
testing situations. 62 First, no constitutional rights are implicated where
54. Id. § 19B(2).
55. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.1-4 (Supp. 1994).
56. Id. § 28-6.1-1.
57. Id.
58. Bemis, supra note 39, at 592-95. The bill's defeat has been attributed to the pres-
ence of a strong business lobby arguing against the amendment as well as to the lack of
sufficient information regarding the validity and accuracy of integrity tests. Id. at 594
n.119. These observations are consistent with other reports that the testing industry is
rapidly gaining visibility, and, it may be presumed, political influence. See O'BANNON ET
AL., supra note 7, at 117-18. Given the fact that those most likely to be adversely affected
by pervasive reliance on honesty testing-namely, the individual job seekers-are also
those least likely to make themselves heard within the political arena, this development
can only serve to highlight the disparity in bargaining power between the testers and the
tested.
59. Bemis, supra note 39, at 595.
60. OR. REV. STAT. § 659.227 (1989).
61. See HPBERT, supra note 1, § 7:11, at 36.
62. At least two types of privacy rights are protected under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution: "One is the individual interest in avoiding disclo-
sure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). Unquestiona-
bly, integrity tests, which require the test taker to reveal often highly personal information,
implicate the first of these rights. In addition, it can be argued that honesty testing, be-
cause it elicits information regarding past misconduct, may give rise to a violation of the
test taker's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Cf Bemis, supra note 39, at
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honesty tests are used by private employers, absent state action. 63 Sec-
ond, it is important to note that, with respect to public employers, an
applicant's voluntary consent to take an integrity test may be interpreted
as a waiver of the applicant's privacy interests.64 Finally, courts have yet
to consider whether a state employer's requirement that applicants sub-
mit to honesty testing in fact violates the job seeker's privacy. 65
Honesty testing might, however, under the proper circumstances con-
stitute a tortious invasion of privacy under common law. The Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts identifies four different situations that might give
rise to a common-law cause of action for violation of a person's right to
privacy: (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (b)
appropriation of another's name or likeness; (c) unreasonable publicity of
another's private life; and (d) publicity that unreasonably places another
in a false light.66 Test questions that are not job-related and unduly probe
into personal and private matters may be characterized as an "intrusion"
sufficient to sustain a claim for tortious invasion of privacy. However, it
has been noted that, thus far, "[t]his argument has failed to succeed in
both of the cases where it has been raised in connection with a written
examination. 67
Some potential statutory regulation of honesty tests is provided by Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,68 which prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, and national origin. Any
integrity test that can be shown to have a disparate adverse impact upon
one of these protected categories of employees could be held in violation
576-77 (an applicant's voluntary consent to take an integrity test may be interpreted as a
waiver of the applicant's privacy interests).
63. See Michael B. Metzger & Dan R. Dalton, "Just Say No" to Integrity Testing, 4 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 23 n.97 (1991). State action requires "a sufficiently close nexus
between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the
latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
64. Bemis, supra note 39, at 576-77. Bemis concedes, however, that the voluntariness
of the individual's consent is very much at issue where refusal to participate may well mean
rejection for the job under consideration. Id.
65. See HP-BERT, supra note 1, § 7:06. Still, even the use of far more invasive psycho-
logical tests has been upheld by the courts where the nature of the job required close
scrutiny of the emotional make-up of job applicants. Id.; see, e.g., McKenna v. Fargo, 451
F. Supp. 1355 (D.N.J. 1978), aff'd, 601 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1979) (probing psychological eval-
uation of firefighter was justified by the government's compelling interest in eliminating
high-risk job candidates).
66. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
67. Metzger & Dalton, supra note 63, at 23 n.97. See Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 431
N.E.2d 908, 910, 912 n.9 (Mass. 1982); Heins v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Re-
view, 534 A.2d 592, 594 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987). On the other hand, an employer may
incur tort liability for wrongfully disclosing information obtained as a result of an integrity
test without the employee's consent. See Bemis, supra note 39, at 584. Disclosure of false
information, finally, may also give rise to a defamation action. Metzger & Dalton, supra
note 63, at 23 n.96.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
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of Title VII. Notwithstanding these limitations, research to date tends to
indicate that integrity tests have no adverse effect on protected groups.69
In sum, neither courts nor federal and state legislatures have taken sig-
nificant steps to regulate or prohibit honesty testing, and it remains a fact
that "[t]he current regulatory method in most states is industry self-regu-
lation. ' 70 For a variety of reasons (discussed in some detail in the pages
to follow), this state of affairs has caused significant concern among many
scholars.
IV. TEST VALIDITY
Several research teams in past years have published comprehensive re-
views of the current status of honesty test research. 71 Although these
scholars have reached somewhat divergent conclusions regarding the util-
ity of honesty testing as a method of employee selection, all agree that
validation research for integrity testing has been marked by serious weak-
nesses. Indeed, critical evaluation of research results is made especially
difficult by the fact that scoring keys are typically proprietary72 and that
the majority of research has been performed by investigators working for
test developers. 73 Nevertheless, some scholars now regard honesty test-
ing with a certain amount of guarded optimism. Sackett et al., for in-
stance, note that, because of significant increases in the availability of
research results, a "more compelling case" can presently be made for the
predictive value of integrity testing than was the case several years ear-
lier.74 The authors remain cautious, however, in part because of the pos-
sibility of suppression of negative results in an environment where much
of the research is conducted by representatives of test publishers, and
because much research continues to be unpublished, affording no oppor-
tunity for peer review.75
69. HtBERT, supra note 1, § 7:09, at 31. Nevertheless, H6bert notes that, since most of
the available research was conducted by the test publishers and suffers from other possible
validity problems, these data are subject to attack, so that the issue is by no means settled.
Id. at 32.
70. David C. Yamada, The Regulation of Pre-Employment Honesty Testing: Striking a
Temporary (?) Balance Between Self-Regulation and Prohibition, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1549,
1578 (1993).
71. See, e.g., O'BANNON ET AL., supra note 7; Paul R. Sackett et al., Integrity Testing
for Personnel Selection: An Update, 42 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 491 (1989); OTA REPORT,
supra note 17, at 8-15; APA REPORT, supra note 28; Guastello & Rieke, supra note 9, at
501.
72. Sackett et al., supra note 71, at 494. As a consequence, peer review of these tests is
greatly hampered, because it is impossible to determine how test answers should be evalu-
ated and what weight should be given to different test questions. Id. at 521.
73. Bernardin & Cooke, supra note 12, at 1098; OTA REPORT, supra note 17, at 39, 49.
As the OTA Report remarks, "[s]ituations such as these, with stakeholders controlling
performance and dissemination of research, necessarily raise caution flags." Id. at 8.
74. Sackett et al., supra note 71, at 520.
75. Id. at 521. The authors state that independent research is discouraged by the pro-
prietary nature of scoring keys and the difficulties in obtaining cooperation from certain
publishers. In addition, they identify as an equally significant factor the fact that academic
researchers have few incentives to become active in the field because publication outlets
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The practice of honesty testing has also received measured endorse-
ment from the American Psychological Association Task Force on Dis-
honesty and Theft, which conducted a detailed review of integrity test
research.76 It is important to note that the APA Task Force reached its
conclusions largely on the basis of pragmatic considerations. In the view
of APA Task Force members, an evaluation of honesty tests cannot be
performed in absolute terms. Rather, the validity of such tests must be
compared against the validity of other, alternative procedures: "In es-
sence," the Task Force submits, "one must always keep salient the ques-
tion, 'What would you have them do instead?' ,77 Unable to identify
satisfactory alternative methods of screening job applicants, 78 the APA
Task Force Report cautions that a prohibition of honesty testing "would
only invite alternative forms of pre-employment screening that would be
less open, scientific, and controllable. '79 The Task Force Report, there-
fore, can be interpreted as a guarded approval of honesty testing.
The APA Task Force's rationale is disquieting. It plainly rests on a pre-
existing value judgment that accords considerably greater weight to the
employer's need to control theft than to the employee's right to be free
from unreasonable intrusion and the danger of stigmatization. Given the
fact that honesty testing is a relatively recent innovation, the authors'
proposition that no satisfactory alternatives to written examinations are
available may well be questioned. Questions may also be raised regard-
ing their apparent, but undocumented presumption that employee theft
has increased in such magnitude as to require new, and previously unnec-
essary, responses. It is quite likely, moreover, that the APA Task Force
Report has contributed significantly to the current reluctance on the part
of legislatures and courts to embark upon efforts to regulate integrity
testing.80 Despite its cautious sanction of integrity testing, however, it
should be kept in mind that the APA Task Force report does point to a
large number of problem areas and strongly stresses the need for further
for validation studies are not easily found and because honesty test research is not a tradi-
tional area of inquiry within personnel psychology.
76. APA REPORT, supra note 28.
77. Id. at 7.
78. Id. at 8-9.
79. Id. at 26. "It is important to realize that any prohibition of honesty-test screening,
unlike the prohibition of the polygraph, could create a niche elsewhere that might be be-
yond professional and scientific review altogether." Id. at 9. The Task Force does not
identify the specific nature of any such "niches" that might be created. Its perhaps overly
cautious approach, furthermore, appears to ignore the fact that employers already have at
their disposal a wide array of more traditional screening procedures (such as background
checks, interviews, criminal record and credit checks, references, etc.) that may well consti-
tute adequate alternatives.
80. Metzger & Dalton, supra note 63, at 12. Metzger and Dalton report that the APA
recommended withdrawal of proposed legislation banning honesty testing to the legisla-
tures of both South Dakota and Connecticut. Id. n.19.
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research,8' the development of guidelines, 82 and increased openness on
the part of test marketers. 83
In contrast to the APA Task Force, the United States Congress Office
of Technology Assessment, in a comprehensive survey of honesty test re-
search, concluded that, "[g]iven the paucity of independent confirmation
of research results, problems identified in published reviews and in
OTA's review of a sample of validity studies, and unresolved problems
relating to the definition and measurement of the underlying psychologi-
cal constructs," existing research was insufficient to conclude that these
tests could reliably predict dishonesty in the workplace.84 The OTA Re-
port rejects the argument that integrity tests are to be considered prefera-
ble to other methods of pre-employment screening and notes that other
methods do not, as a rule, result in the classification of employment appli-
cants as either honest or dishonest individuals. 85 Altogether, pointing to
the dangers of systematic misclassification of those who "fail" honesty
tests, the potential adverse impacts on protected groups, and the serious
privacy implications of honesty testing, the OTA Report urged Congress
to consider these issues in relation to possible regulation of honesty
tests. 86 Another highly critical review of honesty testing has been pub-
lished by Guastello and Rieke, who conclude that the "honesty" con-
struct purportedly measured in honesty tests finds no support in
psychological theory; that the tests can be faked and have little predictive
value; and that integrity test results tend to mislabel otherwise honest
individuals.87
It is clear from the foregoing that scholars are in disagreement regard-
ing the advisability of employer reliance upon integrity testing as a means
of controlling counterproductive or deviant workplace behavior. Indeed,
most authors would concur that significantly more research is required
before the issue may be laid to rest.8 8 Honesty test research to date has
focused primarily on criterion validation, i.e., an empirical investigation
of the extent to which integrity test results may be seen as predictive of
behavior, most often measured in terms of honesty in the workplace. 89
On the other hand, students of the subject have rarely undertaken a criti-
cal examination of the underlying assumptions informing honesty testing.
As currently designed, however, both open and veiled honesty tests ap-
pear to be based upon two fundamental presumptions: (1) that "honesty"
constitutes a measurable trait marked by considerable stability over time;
and (2) that this trait in some form translates, and thus is in fact predic-
tive of, actual behavior. Both assumptions merit closer examination.
81. APA REPORT, supra note 28, at 18-19.
82. Id. at 21.
83. Id. at 21-22.
84. OTA REPORT, supra note 17, at 10.
85. Id. at 67.
86. Id. at 12-18.
87. Guastello & Rieke, supra note 9, at 515-16.
88. See, e.g., H-BERT, supra note 1, § 7:03, at 17.




One of the fundamental difficulties with honesty testing is that no con-
sensus exists regarding the question of what it is that these tests are
designed to measure in the first place.90 This is so mainly because test
developers generally do not make explicit what particular theoretical
framework, if any, has guided their approach in designing integrity tests
and developing test questions. This lack of an express psychological the-
ory of personality notwithstanding, it may be presumed-given the test-
ers' emphasis on "honesty" as well as the evident predictive purpose of
honesty testing-that integrity testing rests on the basic assumption that
honesty or dishonesty constitute measurable personality traits. Accord-
ingly, part of the debate over the validity of integrity testing revolves
around the acceptability of trait theory as an underlying theoretical para-
digm and, within that paradigm, around the question of whether dishon-
esty represents a basic element of individual character. 91
Trait theory assumes that personality is made up of a finite number of
distinguishable attributes, or traits, which can be inferred from behav-
ior.92 Such traits are thought to be qualities that, though variable in
amount, are common to large numbers of people, and constitute rela-
tively stable predispositions that translate with some consistency into par-
ticular behavioral responses.93 The primary task of trait theorists, then, is
to determine what external signs may successfully serve as indicators of
the presumed underlying internal dispositions. 94
An examination of the relevant psychological literature, however,
reveals that considerable controversy exists regarding the general value
of character as a predictor of behavior.95 Indeed, many scholars have
come to reject trait theory entirely, emphasizing instead the significant
influence of situational factors on individual behavior.96 As Walter Mis-
chel, one of the foremost opponents of trait theory, states, "[t]he focus on
internal traits and states as the key determinants of behavior has led to a
tremendous concern with individual characteristics .... Attention to in-
90. See OTA REPORT, supra note 17, at 33, 53.
91. See id at 33.
92. WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT 6 (1968).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 8-9. Despite their differences, psychodynamic theories, which likewise rest
on the basic assumption that personality is made up of underlying mental structures, may
be described in similar terms. See id. at 8.
95. The mere conclusory determination that an individual possesses a trait has little
value:
One focal point of the debate [over integrity testing] is the question of
whether dishonesty is a personality trait. If a test is designed to measure the
degree to which an individual possesses this trait, however, there remains the
question of how the trait is linked to specific behaviors of interest. It is at
least theoretically possible for individuals to be identified as possessing a
trait called dishonesty without their necessarily committing theft or other
counterproductive acts in the workplace.
OTA REPORT, supra note 17, at 33.
96. See David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense
Cases, 78 MirNNr. L. REv. 529, 561 (1994).
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ternalized traits and states has been accompanied by an equally massive
neglect of environmental considerations in assessment. '97 According to
Mischel, research demonstrates that behavior is in fact highly event-spe-
cific; behavioral stability is a function of consistency in the conditions
evoking the behavior and its consequences. "When response-reinforce-
ment relations and discriminative and eliciting stimuli endure over time,
then behavior remains stable; when the maintaining conditions for behav-
ior change, the behavior itself changes." 98 In other words, as long as the
individual remains in a social environment that reacts to his conduct in a
consistent fashion, he or she will tend likewise to respond in a consistent
manner to the same external events. 99 Conversely,
individuals discriminate sharply among even seemingly close stimu-
lus situations and consequently the widespread response consisten-
cies assumed by trait theories usually do not exist. Changes in
stimulus conditions, ranging from trivial changes in the details of the
assessment procedure ... to alterations in the individual's life condi-
tions, all modify the behavior that occurs. People simply are not in-
animate objects like tables . . . [W]hat a person does cannot be
isolated meaningfully from the conditions in which he does it.100
One example that illustrates the importance of considering contextual
variables in explaining behavior arises from psychological research exam-
ining factors that influence automobile accident rates.' 0 ' Initial research
investigating the phenomenon of "accident proneness" among certain
drivers sought to explain this behavioral construct in terms of stable phys-
ical and social characteristics, such as aggressiveness, depression, and so-
cial maladjustment. 10 2 As Shuman reports, however, these variables
failed to account for variations in accident rates of individual drivers over
time. That consideration led psychologists to shift the focus of inquiry to
an examination of other situationally conditioned factors, such as the im-
pact of specific life events on accident proneness. This research, in turn,
"pointed to a significant correlation between life changes, subjective
stress, and accident rates."'01 3 That situational factors can play a signifi-
cant role in shaping individual behavior has long been recognized in the
legal arena, where such considerations partially underlie the traditional
exclusion from evidence of proof of a party's bad character.1°4
On the other hand, situationism is not universally accepted among psy-
chologists. While some scholars continue to adhere to trait theory, others
point to the importance of considering the manner in which traits and
97. MISCHEL, supra note 92, at 288.
98. Id. at 282.
99. Id. at 283.
100. Id. at 293.
101. See, e.g., Daniel W. Shuman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Tort Law: A Limited
Subjective Standard of Care, 46 SMU L. REV. 409, 415-16 (1992).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 416.
104. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES
§§ 186-190 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992).
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situational constraints interact to affect behavior.105 In recent years, sev-
eral commentators have come to regard Mischel's assertions regarding
the low explanatory value of trait theory as an overestimation of the pre-
dictive strength of situational variables.' 06 At the same time, research
indicates that certain identifiable personality traits may be characterized
by substantial longitudinal stability. 10 7 These findings support the notion
that dispositions, as well as situational contingencies, influence behavior.
While some personality traits may prove to be more stable than
others, 08 the seminal work of Hartshorne and May strongly indicates
that dishonesty in particular is very much situationally determined. 10 9
Thus, the authors conclude that
[t]he consistency with which [an individual] is honest or dishonest is
a function of the situations in which he is placed in so far as (1) these
situations have common elements, (2) he has learned to be honest or
dishonest in them, and (3) he has become aware of their honest or
dishonest implications or consequences. 10
Neither deceit nor honesty, according to Hartshome and May, constitute
a unified character trait; rather, both represent "specific functions of life
situations,""' and in yielding to the temptation to deceive, persons re-
spond primarily to situational stressors." 2 Relevant factors that influ-
ence the decision to deceive include "(1) the person . . . or institution
deceived; (2) the motive for [deception]; (3) the thing about which the
deceiver deceives; (4) the way in which it is done; [and] (5) the conse-
quences to the deceiver, the deceived, and others. 1" 3
The rather severe implications of the conclusion reached by Harts-
home and May that dishonesty has no link to personality attributes"14
have since become the subject of some debate. In a reanalysis of the
Hartshorne and May data, Burton found some support for concluding
that an underlying trait of honesty might indeed be elicited from the
105. See Bryden & Park, supra note 96, at 562.
106. David C. Funder & Daniel J. Ozer, Behavior as a Function of the Situation, 44 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 107 (1983). Based upon a review of several studies of the
influence of situational factors on actual behavior, the authors argue that, in general, situa-
tional variables often may not correlate with behavior to a significantly greater degree than
do dispositions. Id at 110-11. They stress the importance of considering other factors (for
example, the nature of the situation, the dispositions selected for measurement, and the
properties of the subject sample) that affect the relative influence of dispositional and situ-
ational factors within any particular study. Id.
107. James J. Conley, Longitudinal Stability of Personality Traits: A Multitrait-Mul-
timethod-Multioccasion Analysis, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1266 (1985).
108. Bryden & Park, supra note 96, at 562. Aggressiveness, for instance, may at least in
certain individuals be marked by a considerable degree of stability. Id. at 562 n.151 (citing
LEONARD BERHOWITZ, AGGRESSION: ITS CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND CONTROL 128
(1993)).
109. HUGH HARTSHORNE & MARK A. MAY, STUDIES IN DECEIT (1928).
110. Id at 380.
111. Id. at 411.
112. Id. at 399.
113. Id. at 402.
114. See id. at 412 ("[n]o one is honest or dishonest by 'nature' ").
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data.1 15 Burton nevertheless agrees with Hartshorne and May that any
such character trait cannot be considered in isolation as an "all or none"
predictor of behavior. 116 The study therefore does not obviate the central
significance of the Hartshorne and May result that dishonest conduct is
largely shaped by contextual factors." 7 It should also be noted that, Bur-
ton's findings notwithstanding, "no research to date has isolated such a
personality trait.""18 What is more, even if an "honesty trait" could be
identified, it is by no means clear exactly how this, or for that matter any
other, personality trait predisposes a person to exhibit certain behaviors
or attitudes." 9
Insofar as honesty test developers justify their approach on the basis of
assumptions, derived from trait theory, regarding the stability and perma-
nence of honesty as a personality attribute, the validity of their constructs
may be questioned on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Honesty
tests are written primarily to obtain information regarding the test taker's
past behavior and current attitudes. 20 Factor analyses of various honesty
tests indicate that they tend to revolve around certain themes, such as
temptation and thoughts about dishonest behavior, actual or expected
dishonest activities, norms about the dishonest behavior of others, and
impulse control and reliable tendencies. 21 In thus focusing upon the test
taker's past indiscretions and his or her attitudes toward theft and dishon-
esty, these tests appear to concentrate exclusively on the subject's per-
sonal predisposition, without taking any account of situational variables
or their interaction with personality constructs in influencing actual
behavior.122
Alternatively, it has been suggested that integrity testing may rest on
no particular theoretical framework at all but, rather, functions as a
115. Roger V. Burton, Generality of Honesty Reconsidered, 70 PSYCHOL. REv. 481, 492
(1963).
116. Id. ("Our analyses indicate that one may conclude there is an underlying trait of
honesty which a person brings with him to a resistance to temptation situation. However,
these results strongly agree with Hartshorne and May's rejection of an 'all or one' formula-
tion regarding a person's character.") Id.
117. See also DAVID T. LYKKEN, A TREMOR IN THE BLOOD 203 (1981); but see OTA
REPORT, supra note 17, at 35 n.34 (citing P. EKMAN, WHY KIDS LIE: How PARENTS CAN
ENCOURAGE TRUTHFULNESS (1989) for the proposition that personality may be of greater
importance than previously believed).
118. Guastello & Rieke, supra note 9, at 513.
119. Cf Conley, supra note 107, at 1281 (noting that "[tihe answer to this question will
determine the ultimate judgment on the utility of the personality perspective").
120. OTA REPORT, supra note 17, at 35.
121. O'BANNON ET AL., supra note 7, at 23 (citing an analysis of the Personnel Selection
Inventory published in M. M. Harris & P. R. Sackett, A Factor Analysis and Item Response
Theory Analysis of an Employee Honesty Test, 2 J. Bus. & PSYCHOL. 122 (1987)).
122. Environmental factors, however, can be expected to be of particular significance
regarding employee deviance. See, e.g., LYKKEN, supra note 117, at 203. ("Employee theft
is probably more dependent upon situational factors-easy opportunity, resentment and
alienation, special need, etc.-than it is on enduring traits of personality that can be mea-
sured by any test."). Indeed, at least some test publishers appear to concede that situa-
tional factors do play a role in conditioning counterproductive behavior. See OTA
REPORT, supra note 17, at 35. Nevertheless, situational measures, such as organizational
variables, are conspicuously absent from integrity tests. Id
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purely predictive model. 123 Such a model relies on empirical validation
of test questions:12 4 only those questions that in experimental situations
can be shown to elicit answers that successfully predict actual behavior
are retained in subsequent versions of the test. 125 Such an approach not
only appears unprincipled, but it also ignores the fact that certain as-
sumptions regarding the predictive value of attitudes or past behavior re-
ported in response to test questions continue to be made and to function
as a basis for evaluation. Furthermore, to the extent that honesty tests
seek to predict future deception based on attitudes, it is important to note
that "behavior predicts attitude about as often as the other way
round. ' 126 A further factor detracting from the predictive utility of atti-
tudinal constructs is the fact that individuals frequently adjust their atti-
tudes post hoc to reflect and rationalize their conduct. This practice may
partly explain the frequently found high correlations between self-admis-
sions of dishonest conduct and attitudes toward dishonesty. 127 All in all,
test developers and researchers to date have paid little attention to the
range of factors affecting the predictive value of attitudinal measure-
ments. 128 Reported past behavior likewise proves to be a problematic
predictor of future action. Not only are admissions of past conduct used
as a surrogate for actual past behavior, but, paradoxically, those persons
who admit to past dishonesty are now reporting this conduct honestly.129
Equally troublesome, for purposes of test validity, is the fact that test
publishers do not agree on which behaviors their tests are designed to
predict. Honesty tests are extremely diverse and do not necessarily iden-
tify a single construct that is purportedly measured. 130 While some pub-
lishers indicate that their tests function as direct measures of "honesty" or
"integrity," others make no reference to these terms, but rather claim
that the tests work to determine levels of "theft proneness," "dependabil-
ity," "counterproductivity," or "antisocial tendencies."' 131
Yet other test marketers present themselves as far more focused in pur-
pose, indicating that their tests are designed to predict a specific problem,
such as employee theft.' 32 Unfortunately, even the "theft" construct
123. OTA REPORT, supra note 17, at 34.
124. Id.
125. OTA REPORT, supra note 17, at 33-34.
126. Guastello & Rieke, supra note 9, at 513. The predictive utility of attitudes is in
part a function of the specificity of the attitude as well as the extent of the individual's
involvement with the attitude target. Id. at 513-14.
127. Cf. Sackett et al., supra note 71, at 508.
128. Guastello & Rieke, supra note 9, at 514.
129. OTA REPORT, supra note 17, at 34; see also Guastello & Rieke, supra note 9, at
514 (since it is presumed that test takers will accurately report prior dishonest activities,
honesty tests may actually be measuring candor rather than dishonesty). This means, of
course, that honesty tests not only penalize test takers for their present honesty but also
fail to take account of the possibility of character reform. The predictive value of past
instances of dishonesty is assumed to be stable, regardless of subsequent intervening events
in a person's life.





proves to be rather vague, for there exists little consensus regarding the
particular types of activities subsumed by the concept. Whereas certain
researchers would refer strictly to the unauthorized taking of property or
cash, 133 others would include various forms of "intangible theft," includ-
ing such varied behaviors as making personal telephone calls or engaging
in theft of time (for instance, by falsifying time cards or abusing sick pay
privileges).134 Moreover, it can be argued that even with respect to the
stealing of property, "theft" is not "theft," since rather different motiva-
tions and constraints underlie the occasional taking of minor office sup-
plies-such as a pen or pencil-as opposed to the calculated theft of
expensive company property.135 It is hence doubtful that any particular
integrity test can accurately predict an across-the-board propensity for
workplace deviance.
B. FAKING
Apart from problems with construct validity, honesty tests suffer from
a somewhat naive reliance upon self-reporting of prior dishonest conduct.
This practice subjects them to the potential for "faking."'1 36 Thus, the
most successful test takers may well be those who answer an honesty test
dishonestly.' 37 But surprisingly many test takers appear to answer truth-
fully, so that the problem may not be as marked as might at first blush be
assumed. 38 Nevertheless, a recent study indicates that at least a portion
of examinees will alter their responses on integrity tests depending upon
the purpose of the test.' 39 As the case may be, because faking benefits
the dishonest job applicant by allowing him to escape detection, it repre-
sents a problem above all for the employer. 40 Faking, therefore, does
133. See, e.g., RICHARD C. HOLLINGER & JOHN P. CLARK, THEFT iY EMPLOYEES 2
(1983).
134. See, e.g., Metzger & Dalton, supra note 63, at 13-14; OTA REPORT, supra note 17,
at 25.
135. The difference between trivial and non-trivial theft (e.g., between taking home a
pencil and embezzlement of large sums of money) would at first blush seem of considera-
ble importance in any test seeking to identify high-risk employees. Surprisingly, honesty
test researchers rarely emphasize these distinctions, but instead simply speak of such cate-
gories as "property theft" or "time theft" as unidimensional aspects of employee deviance.
See, e.g., Karen B. Slora, An Empirical Approach to Determining Employee Deviance Base
Rates, in PREEMPLOYMENT HONESTY TESTING 21 (John W. Jones ed., 1991) [hereinafter
PREEMPLOYMENT HONESTY TESTING]. Not only do honesty test publishers appear uncon-
cerned with this distinction, but no showing has been made that honesty testing is capable
of detecting the difference in the first place. George A. Hanson, To Catch a Thief. The
Legal and Policy Implications of Honesty Testing in the Workplace, 9 L. & INEQUALITY 497,
521 n.99 (1991).
136. Guastello & Rieke, supra note 9, at 513.
137. See APA REPORT, supra note 28, at 13; HPBERT, supra note 1, § 7:03, at 10 n.35.
138. Kathleen M. May & Brenda H. Loyd, Honesty Tests in Academia and Business: A
Comparative Study, 35 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 499, 500-01 (1994).
139. Id. at 508-10. Most honesty tests caution the test taker that the test is designed to
detect dishonest or inconsistent responses. However, it may be expected that, as the public
becomes increasingly familiar with the nature and purpose of honesty tests, greater num-
bers of test takers will resort to faking to achieve a passing score.
140. APA REPORT, supra note 28, at 13.
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not carry with it some of the far-reaching ethical implications that under-
lie the "false positives" problem discussed below.
C. SELECTION OF CHARACTER PROFILE
Honesty tests have also been criticized for making rather simplistic as-
sumptions about human nature and rewarding punitive, authoritarian
personalities, while punishing those who are forgiving and open-
minded. 141 Honesty testers assume that those who view their social sur-
roundings with cynicism and regard deviance as commonplace are them-
selves likely to engage in theft and other counterproductive behavior. 142
They also assume that thieves will favor lenient punishment.143 Thus, the
successful test taker on one hand has faith in his co-workers' honesty, but
on the other tends to mete out swift punishment to those who are found
guilty of dishonesty. 144 Forgiveness, Christian charity, and leniency con-
sequently may lead to rather low test scores.1 45 Ironically, under this
view test designers and employers would appear to be the first to fail
honesty tests, since their very reliance on the efficacy of honesty testing
reveals an underlying belief in the prevalence of employee deviance and
dishonesty. 46
D. THE PROBLEM OF FALSE POSITIVES
Most honesty tests are designed to allow the employer arbitrarily to
impose "cutting scores," separating "honest" from "dishonest" employ-
ees. As Yamada has noted, "the use of cutting scores strongly encourages
employers to engage in easy categorization of job applicants, much to the
misfortune of honest applicants who do not meet the cutting score."'1 47
Therefore, even if integrity tests are efficient and effective tools for iden-
tifying high-risk employees, they entail the danger of mislabeling as de-
141. LYKKEN, supra note 117, at 200-01; Yamada, supra note 70, at 1561; Hanson, supra
note 135, at 509.
142. Hanson supra note 135, at 510.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 509. A frequently cited example demonstrating the preference for authorita-
rian, punitive personalities intrinsic to honesty tests is the story of Sister Terressa, a nun
who, after taking the Reid Report integrity test, was rejected for a position at a B. Dalton
bookstore because of her miserable performance on the test. LYKKEN, supra note 117, at
195-96. As Lykken indicates:
Sister Terressa was handicapped by Christian charity, which ensured that she
would do badly on the 'punitiveness' items. And she was an intelligent, edu-
cated woman, with some experience of the world, and these qualities pre-
vented her from expressing the naive assessment of humankind required to
do well on the 'attitude toward theft' items.
Id. at 201. It was in part Sister Terressa's case that prompted the Minnesota legislature to
forbid the use of lie detector tests in pre-employment screening. Id. at 196. Nevertheless,
as noted above, the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted this statutory provision as inap-
plicable to paper-and-pencil tests. State v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735, 745
(Minn. 1981).
146. See Hanson, supra note 135, at 510.
147. Yamada, supra note 70, at 1562.
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ceitful a significant number of job applicants who are in fact entirely
honest individuals. 148 Indeed, anywhere from thirty to sixty percent of
applicants are thought to fail integrity tests regularly.149 Even integrity
tests possessing demonstrably high levels of validity result in unaccept-
ably high rates of misidentification. 150
According to Sackett et al., the false positives dilemma may not have a
significant effect upon institutional prediction, since the use of honesty
tests enables the employer to avoid hiring dishonest employees to a
greater extent than if such detection devices were not employed.' 5 ' How-
ever, it does have a seriously deleterious effect if the focus shifts toward
the individual applicant, who may be rejected as a consequence of his or
her test performance, despite the fact that he or she is an entirely honest
person. This raises difficulties for employers who cannot afford to turn
away large numbers of job candidates, or who must find employees in a
scarce market. 152
E. RELIABILITY
In addition, existing studies disagree over the test-retest reliability of
overt integrity tests. As Sackett et al. indicate, test-retest reliability stud-
ies show substantial variation in reliability scores. 153 Reliability research
148. See Kevin R. Murphy, Detecting Infrequent Deception, 72 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
611 (1987).
149. Sackett et al., supra note 71, at 522.
150. Metzger & Dalton, supra note 63, at 32. As Metzger & Dalton explain, the degree
to which any particular test will result in "false positive" classification rates (i.e., mistaken
identifications as test failures) is a function of both test accuracy and base rates. Based on
the example of the hypothetical "X-Scan," a test used to identify flawed tires produced by
tire manufacturers, Metzger & Dalton show that even a test with a 98% accuracy level
"means that less than 20% of the tires identified as defective are actually flawed" where the
base rate for tire defects (the proportion of actual defects) is set to .005 (5 tires in 1000).
Id. at 27. Where the accuracy level drops to 90%, the rate of incorrect identification of
fully functional tires rises to an astonishing 95%. Id. at 29. Of course, one problem with
integrity tests is that the actual base rate of employee theft (that is, the percentage of
employees who do in fact steal on the job) is unknown. Id. at 31. According to Metzger &
Dalton's calculations, assuming a base rate of .05 (5% of employees steal) and an accuracy
level of 75% (near the upper end of reported validity coefficients), only 2.9% of those
classified as dishonest will have been correctly identified. Id. at 31-33. The authors state
that there is some consensus in the literature that 5% is indeed an acceptable base rate for
non-trivial employee theft. Id. at 31. Honesty test advocates, however, frequently argue
that actual base rates should be considered much higher, particularly if trivial as well as
non-trivial theft is considered. Higher base rates, of course, significantly reduce the rate of
false positive identifications. Yet, even if the base rate were set to .30 (assuming that 30%
of employees steal), Metzger & Dalton's approach makes it clear that the magnitude of
misidentification is still considerable. At a .30 base rate and 75% accuracy, only 56.3% of
those identified as dishonest by the test in fact will prove to be dishonest. Thus, out of
every 10,000 job applicants, as many as 1750 persons will falsely be labeled as potential
thieves. The immense potential of honesty tests to falsely label innocent job applicants as
undesirable workers and potential thieves has represented a fundamental source of dis-
comfort for many commentators. See, e.g., Guastello & Rieke, supra note 9, at 515-16;
Sackett et al., supra note 71, at 521-23.
151. Sackett et al., supra note 71, at 522.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 513.
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is not available at all for a number of tests, and some scholars suggest that
improved research designs would be helpful.154 Moreover, although
some reliability scores are quite high, time intervals between studies-
insofar as these are reported-are generally very short, ranging from sev-
eral days to several weeks. 155 Such short intervals produce higher relia-
bility scores but are of less scientific utility.
V. EMPLOYER JUSTIFICATIONS FOR USE OF HONESTY
TESTS
Two justifications for using honesty tests as an employee screening de-
vice are commonly advanced: (1) the need to control burgeoning em-
ployee theft (or, more generally, to enhance productivity); 156 and (2) the
threat of lawsuits alleging liability under a theory of negligent hiring.' 57
Neither of these reasons has to date received much critical examination in
the relevant literature.
A. EMPLOYEE THEFT
There is no doubt that employers have a legitimate interest in control-
ling inventory shrinkage and loss of funds, or that employee theft consti-
tutes a significant source of economic and other losses to American
businesses. Estimates of the amount of employees actively involved in
stealing from their employers vary widely, from nine percent to an aston-
ishing seventy-five percent, in large part because of the scarcity of relia-
ble empirical data.1 58 One appraisal of internal crime suggests that fifty
percent of a business' employees are involved in theft at any given time,
with twenty-five percent taking important items, sixteen percent taking
unimportant items, and eight to nine percent systematically stealing one
hundred dollars per week.1 59 According to the same report, viewed lon-
gitudinally, "[s]even out of every ten employees can be expected to steal
154. See O'BANNON, supra note 7, at 68.
155. See Sackett et al., supra note 71, at 512-13. O'Bannon et al. likewise note that
differences in testing intervals employed by different reliability studies make comparisons
difficult, and that longer testing intervals are required in some cases. O'BANNON ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 68.
156. See, e.g., Bemis, supra note 39, at 573.
157. See, e.g., Yamada, supra note 70, at 1563 (identifying, as a third reason, employers'
desire to ensure a productive work force); Metzger & Dalton, supra note 63, at 15.
158. See HOLLINGER & CLARK, supra note 133, at 5; Bernardin & Cooke, supra note
12, at 1105 (estimates based on self-reports, which tend to underestimate actual theft rates,
place the rate between 32% and 75% of the work force); Peter D. Bullard & Alan J.
Resnik, SMR Forum: Too Many Hands in the Corporate Cookie Jar, 25 SLOAN MGMT REV.
51, 51 (1983) ("about four out of ten unscreened employees will steal when given the op-
portunity"); William L. Taylor & Joseph P. Cangemi, Employee Theft and Organizational
Climate, 58 PERSONNEL J. 686, 686 (1979) ("over fifty percent of those who work in plants
and offices steal to some extent, with approximately five to eight percent stealing in
volume").
159. Robert J. Tersine & Roberta S. Russell, Internal Theft: The Multi-Billion-Dollar
Disappearing Act, Bus. HORIZONS, Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 12.
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at one time or another.' 160 The true scope of employee theft, however,
remains largely indeterminate, because no reliable statistics are avail-
able.161 Retailers usually rely upon assessments of inventory shrinkage,
measured in terms of the unaccounted inventory deficit after deduction
of sales and remaining stock. Since shrinkage rates are affected by a vari-
ety of factors in addition to employee theft (such as customer theft, shop-
lifting, waste, and clerical errors), which likewise cannot be accurately
measured, it is impossible to arrive at exact estimates of the effects of
employee theft.162
In 1974, the U.S. Department of Commerce indicated that the cost of
"ordinary crimes" against business exceeded $20 billion.163 Although the
report contained no data to show what proportion of overall crime should
be ascribed to employee theft, it noted that thirteen percent of crimes
against retail establishments could be attributed to internal theft. 164 In
contrast, according to a 1993 article by Greengard, the annual cost of
employee theft had risen to as much as $40 billion.' 65 From ten to thirty
percent of all business failures, moreover, were linked to employee
theft. 66
A 1980 report for mass merchandisers estimated inventory "shrinkage"
(i.e., unexplained losses) to amount to some two percent of sales; fifty
percent of those losses were attributed to internal theft, thirty percent to
external theft, and twenty percent to paperwork errors.167 Ernst &
160. Id. It is important to note that such estimates rarely indicate what is meant by
"theft" and make no effort to distinguish trivial from non-trivial theft.
161. HOLLINGER & CLARK, supra note 133, at 2-3.
162. Id. at 3-4. Hanson likewise points out that "little support exists for the claim that
internal shrinkage is on the rise" and cites the remarks of Ernest Dubester, the legislative
representative of the AFL-CIO, before the Senate Labor and Human Resources Commit-
tee that
a study conducted for the Justice Department by the National Institute of
Justice in 1982 found that "[d]espite the fact that employee theft is generally
viewed as a problem of significant consequences, little reliable data exist re-
garding the phenomenon. The economic impact figures .. seldom go be-
yond the level of alarmist rhetoric."
Hanson, supra note 135, at 499 n.6 (citing Statements in Use of Polygraphs in the Work-
place Before Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA),
June 22, 1987 (available in WESTLAW, BNA-LB Database, No. 119, 1987, at E-1)).
163. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, THE COST OF CRIMES AGAINST
BUSINESS 7 (1974).
164. Id. at 18.
165. Samuel Greengard, Theft Control Starts With HR Strategies, PERSONNEL J., Apr.
1993, at 81; see also Metzger & Dalton, supra note 63, at 13, and references cited therein;
Lynn Adkins, The High Cost of Employee Theft, 120 DUN'S Bus. MONTHLY 66, 67 (1982)
(employee theft amounts to one percent of the Gross National Product, or an annual cost
of $40 billion).
166. Adkins, supra note 165, at 67; Metzger & Dalton, supra note 63, at 14.
167. See Bullard & Resnik, supra note 158, at 51-52 (citing estimates presented in NA-
TIONAL RETAIL MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION, DEPARTMENT AND SPECIALTY STORE MER-
CHANDISING AND OPERATING RESULTS OF 1979 (1980)). Adkins, in turn, details the
results of an Arthur Young & Co. survey of 127 companies, according to which one half of
all shrinkage (or one percent of total sales) was due to employee theft. Adkins, supra note
165, at 71. Among those businesses most vulnerable to theft of cash are banks, small con-
venience stores and gas stations. Theft of tools and equipment, in turn, is most likely to
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Young's survey of retail merchants, conducted a decade later, indicates
that shrinkage losses have remained stable at slightly above two percent
of sales. 168 Thus, the magnitude of the shrinkage problem appears to
have experienced little change over time.
The Ernst & Young data regarding losses resulting from theft are sig-
nificant in that they provide factual information with respect to theft ap-
prehension rates for employees and customers, and thus provide a far
more reliable basis for assessing the actual scope of employee theft.
Given the frequent high estimates of employee theft, it is surprising that,
according to the Ernst & Young survey, only 30,000 (or 7%) of the
406,000 persons apprehended for retail theft in 1990 were employees,
whereas the overwhelming majority of theft apprehensions made were of
business customers. 169 As these percentage distributions were identical
to those reported for the International Mass Retail Association's 1988
survey,'170 it appears that the survey results do not merely represent the
product of a skewed sample but accurately reflect employee theft appre-
hension rates within the retail industry. Viewed proportionately, em-
ployee theft may therefore constitute far less of a problem than do
customer theft or other crimes against businesses.
The survey indicates, however, that even though merely seven percent
of those caught were employees, thirty-eight percent of the total dollar
value recovered by retail businesses was recovered from apprehended
employees. 171 While this result may lead to the conclusion that dishonest
employees tend to steal items of greater value than do customers, it
should be approached with some caution. The survey speaks only to
funds recovered but is silent regarding the actual losses incurred due to
employee versus customer theft. For a number of reasons, it may be eas-
ier for retailers to recover damages from current or former employees
than from occasional customers. 172 The survey also assumes that the
prevalence of employee theft is exacerbated by the fact that, whereas re-
tailers recovered $164,000 per company from employee apprehensions,
occur in the construction and energy business. Significantly, while Adkins states that the
most costly type of employee theft takes the form of fraudulent schemes, the statistics cited
include instances of trivial theft as well. Id. at 71, 73.
168. Ernst & Young Survey, supra note 11, at 4.
169. Id.; but see Diane Filipowski, HR Plays a Direct Role in Decreasing Employee
Theft, PERSONNEL J., Apr. 1993, at 88 (citing results of the 1992 National Retail Security
Survey, which concluded that 37.8% of all retail shrinkage in 1991 was caused by employee
theft).
170. See Drug Use a Growing Cause of Merchandise Loss, Survey Finds, DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA), Dec. 29, 1989 (available in WEsTLAw, BNA-LB Database, 249 DLR A-5,
1989).
171. Ernst & Young Survey, supra note 11, at 4.
172. Thus, the merchant is more likely to be aware of an employee's address, location,
and personal circumstances, and hence may be in a better position to pursue a demand and
possible court action against employees. In addition, if the apprehended employee has not
been discharged, the retailer can exert significant leverage because restitution may be de-
manded as an alternative to termination and because the retailer remains in control of the
employee's paycheck. Finally, an employee may be more readily motivated to make resti-
tution in order to avoid further negative impact on his or her career and reputation.
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employees admitted to stealing an additional $241,000 per company that
was not recovered. 173 Because the survey provides no comparable data
for unrecovered amounts stolen by customers, this information is, again,
of little value in determining the proportional impact of employee theft
on inventory shrinkage rates.
As much as ninety-three percent of all theft in the retail industry, then,
may be the product of customer deviance rather than employee miscon-
duct. Moreover, there are other indications that the problem of em-
ployee theft may not only often be overstated in the literature, but that its
causes may stem from factors quite unrelated to the operation of individ-
ual character traits. Thus, Hollinger and Clark, in summing up their de-
tailed study of the phenomenon, conclude:
Taking company property was reported by about one-third of em-
ployees in the three industry sectors surveyed: retail, hospital, and
electronics manufacturing. Most of the theft reported, however, was
not very serious and occurred rather infrequently. In fact, the modal
employee did not report any property theft. Even though we recog-
nize that our data are obviously conservative estimates, we neverthe-
less feel that this book seriously challenges those who declare that
everybody is stealing. 174
The authors add that theft of property amounts to only a small propor-
tion of the employee deviance encountered in the workplace, and that the
same circumstances giving rise to theft also tend to foster other counter-
productive conduct such as sloppy workmanship, various forms of time
theft, and alcohol and drug abuse. 175 Rather than attributing such con-
duct to particular personality traits or even the life circumstances of spe-
cific deviant employees, the authors
found that both property theft and counterproductive behavior can
be explained best by factors intrinsic, not extrinsic, to the work set-
ting .... Even though economic and broader societal variables may
help to explain street crime, [the study] could find no corresponding
utility/benefit from these variables in understanding employee theft.
Continuing to search for scapegoat explanations external to the work
organization simply confuses our understanding of this essentially
work-place phenomenon. 176
According to Hollinger and Clark, the most important variable affecting
employee theft and counterproductive behavior was the perceptions that
individual workers formed of their work environment: employees who
were dissatisfied with their jobs and who considered themselves to be
exploited by the company tended to exhibit far higher rates of theft than
those who believed that the employer was genuinely concerned for their
welfare. 177
173. Ernst & Young Survey, supra note 11, at 54-55.
174. HOLLINGER & CLARK, supra note 133, at 141.
175. Id.




Research regarding the social and institutional dynamics of employee
theft thus shows that its mere existence does not alone justify resort to
honesty testing. Insofar as theft is a product of situational factors, includ-
ing conditions that are internal and specific to the workplace, integrity
testing may be of little utility in reducing theft rates because it assumes
that the problem is particular to the employee and controllable through
the selective elimination of employers who display "counterproductive"
tendencies. Such an approach is dangerously deceptive in that it ignores
workplace realities and invites the mistaken presumption that a complex,
context-specific problem may be solved quickly and inexpensively
through the simple administration of a standardized test.
Researchers, however, generally agree that the phenomenon of em-
ployee theft is by no means unidimensional. Bullard and Resnik, for in-
stance, suggest that employee theft is the product of an interplay among
four primary factors: (1) opportunity, measured in terms of access to
money or property; (2) integrity or employee honesty; (3) personal pres-
sures that work to increase the individual's inclination to steal; and (4)
organizational climate, relating to the particular qualities of the corpora-
tion that serve to encourage or prevent theft. 178 Employers have all too
often paid too much attention to the first two factors while failing to give
sufficient consideration to the last two. 179 Yet organizational culture and
climate can have multifaceted and complex effects upon counterproduc-
tive behavior within the work force.
At one end of the spectrum, it has been shown that such objectively
measurable variables as compensation levels, the types of compensation
provided, employee and management turnover rates, and full-time versus
part-time employment can have a significant effect on retail shrinkage. 180
Similarly, the development of a well-defined and well-publicized code of
ethics regarding internal theft may have a substantial impact on deter-
rence of employee theft.' 8 '
178. Bullard & Resnik, supra note 158, at 53. According to the authors, opportunity
occupies a special position, because it functions as a catalyst for the remaining factors:
"when there is little opportunity to steal, even the employee with the lowest level of integ-
rity will find it difficult to do so. Hence, opportunity generally is the favorite target of
corporate security systems." Id.
179. See Filipowski, supra note 169, at 88. The third factor listed by Bullard & Resnik,
relating to personal pressures for the most part lies outside the employer's sphere of influ-
ence and is often not amenable to preventive or remedial action. However, management's
display of genuine interest in the well-being of individual employees may serve to counter-
act some personal pressures. Thus, some conclude, if a manager is aware of a particular
problem faced by an employee, he may be able to provide assistance, thereby deflecting
the impulse to steal. See id.
180. Id. Taylor and Cangemi likewise report that a large proportion of employees steal
because of on-the-job irritations, such as "[flow and inadequate wage or salary, resentment
against the company for alleged unfair or inconsistent policies, inordinately severe discipli-
nary actions, substandard working conditions, or a deep-seated feeling of not being appre-
ciated by superiors." Taylor & Cangemi, supra note 158, at 687 (quoting UNITED STATES
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, A HANDBOOK ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME 55 (1974)).
181. See Bullard & Resnik, supra note 158, at 55.
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On the other end, in a less quantifiable but equally valid sense,
counterproductive conduct can also be seen as a consequence of the nor-
mative culture and value systems existing both internally within the or-
ganization, and externally within society as a whole. Employee theft, as
long as it remains within certain preestablished parameters of acceptabil-
ity, is rarely viewed as criminal or even deviant behavior either inside or
outside of the workplace. 182 Indeed, some argue that the numerous eu-
phemisms available for describing internal theft (such as "unaccounted
loss, inventory shrinkage, missing goods, . . pilferage, tapping the till,
borrowing, lifting, . . fiddling," etc.) themselves reveal the underlying
social reluctance to condemn such conduct. 183
After conducting an in-depth ethnographic study of pilferers at an Eng-
lish bakery, Jason Ditton concluded that "[f]iddling is not morally and
normatively supported by a contra-culture[,] one in qualitative opposition
to the main themes of society ... [but is] contextually dependent upon
the legitimate structure of 'service' . . . [F]iddling is a subculture of legiti-
mate commerce itself." 184 Fiddlers carefully shape and control their
moral identity within the company, 185 and they take pains to borrow from
the general cultural value system of their society those values and beliefs
necessary to justify their conduct. 186 Ultimately, it is "the weak social
reaction to fiddling which preserves the 'partial' self" that the fiddler has
created. 87
Other researchers have noted that both the nature and the degree of
employee theft are, in important respects, functions of organizational cul-
ture, controlled by group norms as they develop in different occupational
settings.' 88 Each organizational environment, moreover, may contain its
own norms regarding employee theft; as long as pilferers stay within the
acceptable limits defined by the group's normative structure, their actions
182. See, e.g., Tersine & Russell, supra note 159, at 15. The authors also indicate that
employees who steal can easily avail themselves of any of a number of different
justifications:
Thieves maintain a positive self-concept by using any of the following ratio-
nalizations: They feel underpaid and unappreciated; they may have worked
overtime without extra pay or been yelled at for something that was not their
fault. By stealing, they are only taking what's rightfully theirs. Stealing from
the company serves the same purpose as sabotage and yields more personal
benefits. Crimes have victims; impersonal businesses don't suffer .... The
ultimate rationalization is: Everyone is doing it.
Id.
183. Id.
184. JASON DrrTON, PART-TIME CRIME: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF FIDDLING AND PILFER-
AGE 173 (1977) (emphases in original).
185. Id. at 177-79.
186. Id. at 173-77.
187. Id. at 180.
188. Taylor & Cangemi, supra note 158, at 687-88; see also HOLLINGER & CLARK, supra
note 133, at 145 ("informal social controls initiated by fellow workers, such as gossip, ridi-
cule, and ostracism are much more effective sanctions"); Greengard, supra note 165, at 84
(discussing corporate culture as a basis for building an honest work force).
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will be granted protection by the work group as a whole.189 The structure
of the work group, in turn, largely determines the degree to which em-
ployee theft will be considered permissible behavior. 190 Where the orga-
nizational climate nurtures cohesiveness, group norms are more likely to
focus on performance of tasks rather than on satisfaction of needs.19' In
contrast, organizations that foster low employee morale and worker
alienation are more often subject to high pilferage.' 92
A closer analysis of both the prevalence of employee theft within the
workplace and of the underlying factors giving rise to such counter-
productive behaviors can lead to important conclusions regarding the
usefulness and appropriateness of honesty testing as a method of control-
ling internal theft. Specifically, increasing employer reliance on integrity
tests as predictors of real-life behaviors entails two fundamental dangers.
First, there is a strong likelihood that honesty tests will unduly objectify
and alienate the job applicant by focusing the employer's attention upon
his test performance rather than upon his particular qualities as an indi-
vidual. Cutting scores, which separate the applicant pool into two basic
groups and label those who fall below the cutoff as essentially "deceitful"
in character, not only offer a false sense of scientific accuracy but also
detract attention from a more subjective consideration of other individual
qualities that may counterbalance a low test score. Moreover, honesty
testing may itself prove counterproductive: to the extent that integrity
tests are either perceived as intrusive and offensive by test takers or sig-
nal pervasive mistrust of worker integrity on the part of management,
they undermine employee morale and thus encourage the very behaviors
they are designed to prevent.
Second, by approaching honesty as a fixed and unchangeable charac-
teristic, honesty tests de-emphasize the malleable nature of on-the-job
conduct and its dependence upon contextual factors. Because honesty
tests result in objective scores based upon presumably scientific stan-
dards, they are also deceptive in that they invite undue reliance on test
outcomes to the exclusion of other relevant considerations. Employers
who adopt integrity testing as a screening mechanism may thus be less
inclined to realize their own role in creating the conditions that stimulate
employee theft and hence may take less responsibility for maintaining a
work environment that actively fosters honesty and productivity. Theft
proclivity becomes an externality, a social cost for which the individual
company is not accountable and that does not enter the corporate bottom
line other than in the form of expenditures for integrity testing. Yet, if
employee theft is engendered by the very corporate environment that
189. Taylor & Cangemi, supra note 158, at 687 (citing D.N.M. Homing, Blue Collar
Theft: Conceptions of Property, Attitudes Toward Pilfering, and Work Group Norms in a
Modern Industrial Plant, in CRIMES AGAINST BUREAUCRACY (E.O. Smigel & H.L. Ross
eds., 1970)).
190. Id. at 687.
191. Id. at 688.
192. Id. at 688, 714.
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seeks to avoid it, employers would be well advised to conduct periodic
assessments of their own organizational cultures to maintain control over
counterproductive behaviors.
B. NEGLIGENT HIRING
Test marketers frequently advance a second justification for using hon-
esty testing as an employment screening device: honesty testing, they con-
tend, provides a solid defense against the ever-increasing number of
negligent hiring claims brought by third parties who have been injured by
the actions of employees. This rationale is subject to considerable criti-
cism, not only because negligent hiring actions tend to revolve around
instances of employee violence, which honesty tests largely are not
designed to detect, but also because integrity testing has never been used
as a defense in any reported negligent hiring claim. 193 Few commenta-
tors, however, have accorded the negligent hiring justification more than
a cursory acknowledgement. In light of the growing popularity of this
cause of action and its acceptance within an increasing number of juris-
dictions, 194 the nexus between negligent hiring liability and employee in-
tegrity testing invites closer examination.
Under the doctrine of negligent hiring, an employer may be held liable
to third parties for the negligent or tortious conduct of an employee, re-
gardless of whether the latter acted within the scope of his or her employ-
ment, if the employer failed to use care in hiring the employee. 195 The
193. See Yamada, supra note 70, at 1564.
194. See, e.g., Svacke v. Shelley, 359 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1961); Kassman v. Busfield En-
ters., Inc., 639 P.2d 353 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Connes v. Molalla Transp. Sys., Inc., 831 P.2d
1316 (Colo. 1992) (en banc); Shore v. Town of Stonington, 444 A.2d 1379 (Conn. 1982);
Island City Flying Serv. v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 585 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1991); C.K.
Security Sys., Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 223 S.E.2d 453 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976);
Easley v. Apollo Detective Agency, Inc., 387 N.E.2d 1241 (I11. App. Ct. 1979); D.R.R. v.
English Enters., CATV, Div. of Gator Tansp., Inc., 356 N.W.2d 580 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984);
Plains Resources, Inc. v. Gable, 682 P.2d 653 (Kan. 1984); Henley v. Prince George's
County, 503 A.2d 1333 (Md. 1986); Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983);
Jones v. Toy, 476 So. 2d 30 (Miss. 1985); Gaines v. Monsanto Co., 655 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983); Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508 (N.J. 1982); F & T Co. v. Woods, 594 P.2d 745
(N.M. 1979); Thahill Realty Co. v. Martin, 388 N.Y.S.2d 823 (Civ. Ct. 1976); Dayton Hud-
son Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155 (Okla. 1980); Dempsey v. Walso
Bureau, Inc., 246 A.2d 418 (Pa. 1968); Welsh Mfg., Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Pinkerton's, Inc.,
474 A.2d 436 (R.I. 1984); Estate of Arrington v. Fields, 578 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co., 386 P.2d 910 (Utah 1963); La-
Lone v. Smith, 234 P.2d 893 (Wash. 1951).
195. Rodolfo A. Camacho, How to Avoid Negligent Hiring Litigation, 14 WHrrrIER L.
REV. 787, 791-92 (1993); Donald J. Petersen & Douglas Massengill, The Negligent Hiring
Doctrine-A Growing Dilemma for Employers, 15 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 419, 419-20 (1989-
90). The doctrine of respondeat superior is based upon principles of agency and holds the
employer potentially liable for acts committed by the employee within the scope of em-
ployment and in furtherance of the employer's business. Negligent hiring differs:
IT]he tort of negligent hiring addresses the risk created by exposing members
of the public to a potentially dangerous individual, while the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior is based on the theory that the employee is the agent or is
acting for the employer. Therefore the scope of employment limitation on
liability which is a part of the respondeat superior doctrine is not implicit in
the wrong of negligent hiring.
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doctrine thus conforms to the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which
states that "[a] person conducting an activity through servants or other
agents is subject to liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is
negligent or reckless ... in the employment of improper persons or in-
strumentalities in work involving risk of harm to others. '196 In order to
prevail under a negligent hiring theory, a plaintiff must prove the follow-
ing six elements:
(1) an employment relationship must have existed between the [em-
ployer] and the [employee]; (2) the employee must have been unfit
[for the position]; (3) the employer must have known or should have
known through reasonable investigation that the employee was unfit;
(4) the employee's tortious act must have been the cause-in-fact of
the plaintiff's injuries; (5) the negligent hiring must have been the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries; and (6) actual damage or
harm must have resulted from the tortious act.197
Most negligent hiring.claims turn on the issues of duty and foreseeabil-
ity.198 Employers generally owe a duty of care where a special relation-
ship with the third party exists. 199 But even if no special relationship can
be identified, courts will consider the surrounding circumstances to de-
cide whether a duty of care should be imposed.200 A central factor influ-
encing the degree of care an employer must exercise in selecting a
particular employee relates to the nature and amount of contact the em-
ployee is expected to have with the general public in the performance of
his or her duties.20' The employer breaches its duty of care if it fails to
conduct a reasonable background investigation of the employee. What is
"reasonable" largely depends on the particular type of job and the possi-
bility that an unfit employee in that position could foreseeably cause
harm to a third party.202 Some courts have held that an employer's fail-
ure to conduct a pre-employment investigation is not unreasonable if the
Di Cosala, 450 A.2d at 515.
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 213 (1958).
197. Cindy M. Haerle, Note, Employer Liability for the Criminal Acts of Employees
Under Negligent Hiring Theory: Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1303,
1308 (1984). In addition, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer owed the plain-
tiff a duty of care. Id.
198. Charles A. Odewahn & Darryl L. Webb, Negligent Hiring and Discrimination: An
Employer's Dilemma?, 1989 LAB. L.J. 705, 707-08.
199. Special relationships have been found to exist, for instance, on the part of land-
lords, Kendall v. Gore Properties, 236 F.2d 673, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1956), and common carriers,
Burch v. A & G Assocs., Inc., 333 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). Schools, as well
as police and fire departments, likewise have a heightened duty to members of the public.
See David L. Gregory, Reducing the Risk of Negligence in Hiring, 14 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J.
31, 33 (1988).
200. Odewahn & Webb, supra note 198, at 708; see Di Cosala, 450 A.2d at 514; Carlsen
v. Wackenhut Corp., 868 P.2d 882, 887 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (advocating use of "a balanc-
ing test to determine if the given employment warrants the extra burden of a thorough
background check").
201. See, e.g., Connes, 831 P.2d at 1325; see also Haerle, supra note 197, at 1308; Flem-
ing v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915, 917 (D.C. 1951).
202. Cathie A. Shattuck, The Tort of Negligent Hiring and the Use of Selection Devices:




employee's unfitness could not have been ascertained through a normal
or customary investigation.203 By contrast, others have found failure to
investigate a per se breach of duty.20 4
The most significant element of the breach-of-duty component, how-
ever, is the question of foreseeability, a factor that often also influences
the court's determination of whether a duty existed in the first place. 205
To establish foreseeability, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to demon-"
strate that the employer should have foreseen the precise injury suffered
as a consequence of the employee's tortious act; rather, a plaintiff must
only show that there was a foreseeable risk that some injury might oc-
cur.20 6 Conversely, if it simply could not be anticipated that an employee
in a given job would pose any risk to the general public, the court may
hold that no duty to conduct an independent investigation existed in the
first place. 20 7
Because foreseeability is so often regarded as establishing the existence
of both a duty and its breach, the theory of negligent hiring places a sig-
nificant burden on employers. Lacking the benefit of hindsight, employ-
ers must resolve complex questions of projected behavior even before
they begin to seek applicants for particular positions. In order to mini-
mize their exposure to liability for negligent hiring, employers must care-
fully analyze the severity and types of third-party risks involved in each
available job prior to soliciting applications. Their difficulties are com-
pounded by the fact that courts have been inclined to take a rather
sweeping view of the range of outcomes that should be considered fore-
seeable risks, yet have provided few guidelines to aid employers in defin-
ing the elements of employee "fitness," or in deciding just how probing a
"reasonably sufficient" background investigation should be.20 8 Since the
scope of the investigation that the employer must reasonably undertake is
commonly viewed as a function of the degree of risk that an unfit em-
ployee might present to the public, the employer often has little option
but to embark on an exhaustive search of the employee's circumstances
and qualifications. 20 9 Not surprisingly, employers might consider honesty
203. See Ponticas, 331 N.W.2d at 912-13; Stone, 386 P.2d at 911.
204. See Haerle, supra note 197, at 1310 (citing Weiss v. Furniture-In-The-Raw, 306
N.Y.S.2d 253, 255 (Civ. Ct. 1969)).
205. The duty and foreseeability components of the tort are thus closely intertwined.
Courts often expressly apply a "foreseeability test," considering whether a reasonable per-
son would have anticipated that injury might result, in order to establish the scope of the
defendant's duty. See Harry H. Lipsig, Negligent Hiring and Retention, N.Y. L.J., June 3,
1991 (available in WESTLAW, NYU Database, 6/3/91 NYLJ 3, (col. 1)).
206. Ponticas, 331 N.W.2d at 912; Malorney v. B & L Motor Freight, Inc., 496 N.E.2d
1086, 1088 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (citing Neering v. Illinois, 50 N.E.2d 497, 503 (Ill. 1943)).
207. See Connes v. Molalla Transp. Sys., 831 P.2d 1316, 1323 (Colo. 1992) (en banc)
(employer had no reason to foresee that person hired as long-haul truck driver would sexu-
ally assault or otherwise behave violently toward any member of the public, as driver's
duties did not involve more than incidental contact with third persons).




testing as a necessary, or at least useful, safeguard against potential
liability.
The majority of negligent hiring cases have involved plaintiffs who suf-
fered physical harm as a result of employee violence, and courts conse-
quently have focused above all on the employer's duty to investigate an
applicant's prior criminal history.210 Because honesty tests are not rou-
tinely designed to detect aggressiveness or violent tendencies, some sug-
gest that they bear little substantial relationship to the types of conduct at
issue in traditional negligent hiring claims and hence are of little benefit
as either an empirical precaution or a legal defense.21'
That point, however, is debatable. Nothing in the nature of negligent
hiring as a theory of liability would confine its application strictly to those
circumstances where the plaintiff sustained physical injury rather than
economic damage. The fact that the negligent hiring doctrine has not
often been employed to recover for damages other than physical harm
should not be regarded as detracting in any manner from its viability in
that respect. Moreover, although they currently remain few in number,
several reported cases in different states have involved circumstances
under which liability was imposed upon the employer for harm suffered
as a result of the dishonest acts of its employees.
In Welsh Manufacturing, Inc. v. Pinkerton's, Inc.,212 for example, a se-
curity company was found liable for negligence in the hiring of a security
guard who used his position of trust at the plaintiff company to aid ac-
complices in stealing vast amounts of gold from the plaintiff. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court reasoned:
Pinkerton's was offering a service the very essence of which required
honest, trustworthy, and reliable personnel. The sensitive nature of
the employment, coupled with the opportunity and temptations inci-
dent to it, would lead to the conclusion that a prudent employer in
these circumstances should rely on more than the absence of specific
evidence or statements that a potential employee is dishonest or
criminally inclined. We believe that a reasonable investigation would
call for affirmative statements attesting to an applicant's honesty,
trustworthiness, and reliability and perhaps also require the disclo-
sure of the basis upon which the recommending person has relied.21 3
Although nothing in the court's opinion indicates that Pinkerton's was
under any duty to go beyond the customary background and reference
check by subjecting its guards to integrity tests, the court's language does
imply that the results of an honesty test conducted as part of the applica-
tion process could present strong evidence that the employer carried out
a reasonable investigation.
210. See, e.g., Cramer v. Housing Opportunities Comm'n, 501 A.2d 35 (Md. 1985);
Gaines v. Monsanto Co., 655 S.W.2d 568-70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Nigg v. Patterson, 276
Cal. Rptr. 587, 596-97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Carlsen 868 P.2d at 882; Cherry v. Kelly Servs.,
Inc., 319 S.E.2d 463 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); see generally Gregory, supra note 199, at 36-39.
211. See Yamada, supra note 70, at 1564-65.
212. 474 A.2d 436 (R.I. 1984).
213. Id. at 440-41.
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Similarly, a Georgia court of appeals, reasoning that a security com-
pany is under a duty "to exercise a greater amount of care to ascertain
[whether] its employees [are] honest and [are] not likely to commit
thefts," imposed liability on a security company for the negligent hiring of
a guard who subsequently stole and forged a blank check belonging to
the plaintiff.2 14 And finally, in Pruitt v. Pavelin,215 an Arizona court an-
nounced that a realty company had been negligent in the hiring of a dis-
honest real estate salesperson who had defrauded the plaintiff by forging
signatures on a sales contract and security documents.2 16
As the foregoing examples demonstrate, courts can and do hold em-
ployers liable for negligence in the hiring of dishonest employees whose
crimes of deceit cause damage to third parties. This is not to say, how-
ever, that it is likely that courts will impose an affirmative duty upon em-
ployers to make use of any available means to detect dishonesty at the
pre-hiring stage. As noted previously, the scope and depth of the re-
quired investigation is largely a function of the degree of the anticipated
risk of harm to others associated with a particular position of employ-
ment.217 Given the invasive nature of integrity tests, which probe into
highly personal thoughts and attitudes and inquire about instances of
prior conduct that most individuals would presumably prefer not to dis-
cuss with strangers, it is unlikely that honesty testing would be considered
a necessary procedure in the great majority of employment situations.
Moreover, although courts have exhibited a marked proclivity for impos-
ing a duty to research existing background information (such as criminal
records, work history, and employer references) regarding a potential
new hire, they have thus far not required that employers actively gener-
ate additional data, such as by means of personality testing.2 18
Although no duty to conduct honesty testing has yet been imposed by
the courts, evidence of favorable integrity test results might nevertheless
constitute a successful defense against potential future negligent hiring
claims involving employee dishonesty. The problem here, however, re-
lates back to the issue of construct validity. Only some "honesty tests" in
fact purport to measure "honesty" itself, while many others seek instead
214. C.K. Security Sys., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 223 S.E.2d 453, 455
(Ga. Ct. App. 1976).
215. 685 P.2d 1347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
216. The court was swayed in large part by the fact that the employer had misrepre-
sented the salesperson's trustworthiness to the state licensing department:
Instead of assisting the department, the broker actively helped an employee,
known to be dishonest, obtain a license to ply a trade which put the em-
ployee in a position where the public entrusted her with, and received from
her, important documents and relied upon her to deal with them honestly.
The employer actively and knowingly put it within the power of a dishonest
employee to work a fraud upon the plaintiff.
Id. at 1354.
217. See Connes, 831 P.2d at 1321-22, and cases discussed therein.
218. See, e.g., Lipsig, supra note 205 (arguing that courts are reluctant to require exten-
sive background investigations of employees because of the sizeable burden this require-
ment would impose upon employers).
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to assess such diverse constructs as "counterproductivity," "theft prone-
ness," "dependability," or even substance abuse.2 19 Test results showing
an employee to rank high on the dependability scale, or to have a low
propensity for theft, unfortunately will do little to protect an employer
against a claim that the employee has committed fraud or forgery. Thus,
the great variability in the content and purpose of honesty tests, coupled
with the scientific debate surrounding their validity, renders their likely
acceptance by judges and juries questionable.
This proposition derives further support from the federal district
court's decision in Thatcher v. Brennan,220 which indicates that courts
may well be reluctant to accept the results of personality measures as
conclusive proof of foreseeability. In Thatcher, the plaintiff claimed that
he had been assaulted by a company salesman and argued that the event
should have been foreseeable to the employer, since a personality inven-
tory administered to the employee at the time of hiring showed him to be
"moody" and of "high aggression." Those results had been interpreted
by a clinical psychologist to mean that the employee lacked self-control,
socialization skills, and responsibility.221 These findings notwithstanding,
the court rejected the plaintiff's argument, to rule that the test results
alone had not put the company on notice of the employee's violent
propensities and that "the total lack of evidence of any violent conduct by
[the employee] over the succeeding two years certainly belies any claim
of negligent hiring under the circumstances of this case. '222
Honesty testing, then, may not prove to be a very dependable or palat-
able defense against negligent hiring liability for employee dishonesty.
Equally relevant to an assessment of the utility of this defense is the fact
that the great majority of negligent hiring actions, as mentioned before,
involve employee violence rather than dishonesty. In those cases, hon-
esty testing can rarely be expected to provide a satisfactory defense, as
integrity tests are neither designed to detect prior criminal or deviant
conduct,2 23 nor capable of identifying the kind of violent behavior that
typically gives rise to negligent hiring claims.224 To date, reliance on hon-
esty testing has not in any reported case been used as a defense to a
negligent hiring claim.225 Given the continued scientific debate over the
validity of integrity tests, and the likelihood that test results may not be
unequivocally accepted by the trier of fact, employers would be ill ad-
vised to resort to honesty testing as a substitute for other methods of
background investigation in order to guard against negligent hiring
liability.
219. APA REPORT, supra note 28, at 12.
220. 657 F. Supp. 6 (S.D. Miss. 1986), aff'd, 816 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1987).
221. Id. at 11.
222. Id. at 12.
223. Although overt integrity tests frequently rely on a self-admission scale, it is en-
tirely conceivable that employees who wish to conceal their criminal background will not
respond truthfully.
224. Yamada, supra note 70, at 1564-65.
225. Id at 1564.
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VI. SOCIAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF HONESTY
TESTING
Increasing employer reliance on integrity testing entails serious social
and ethical concerns that have received only sporadic attention in the
relevant literature. As a preliminary matter, it is important to keep in
mind that absurd results may result if credence is lent to the claim of
some test advocates that up to seventy-five percent of employees will at
some time be guilty of stealing from their employers. Employers as well
as test developers clearly consider employee theft to constitute deviant
conduct. This view, however, leads to the inevitable conclusion that the
great majority of the work force should be regarded as aberrant, render-
ing employee theft an oxymoronic instance of "normative deviance."
Yet, if stealing represents the order of the day, honesty testing is of
doubtful utility because it can neither cure the underlying causes of em-
ployee misconduct nor ensure that the majority of job seekers will not by
necessity be eliminated from the eligible work force.226 Clearly, this is
not a desirable outcome.
Second, integrity tests have a propensity to label and stigmatize not
only the dishonest worker, but, due to the false positives problem, also
many workers who are in fact entirely honest individuals.22 7 Unfortu-
nately, to the extent that honesty tests have the degree of reliability and
replicability attributed to them by test publishers, individuals who do not
perform well on any given test may be expected to consistently score low
on all subsequent honesty tests as well. This fact raises the possibility that
paper-and-pencil integrity testing may give rise to an entire class of re-
peatedly misclassified job seekers, whose test results may ultimately
render them entirely unemployable.228
Furthermore, because integrity tests are typically employed to screen
applicants for lower-level, unskilled or semi-skilled positions,229 they tend
226. Honesty testers might partially alleviate this problem by distinguishing between
instances of trivial and non-trivial theft. It may well be that a large proportion of employ-
ees have at one time or another taken home an office pen or failed to report an extended
lunch break. Such minor misconduct does not justify classifying the culpable employee as
belonging to the same "high-risk" category as the serious delinquent. Nonetheless, hon-
esty tests all too often fail to differentiate between these types of "theft" and to approach
all reported behaviors as equally problematic.
227. Hanson, supra note 135, at 520; see also supra subpart IV.D.
228. Hanson, supra note 135, at 522-23. As one commentator aptly puts it:
One must never lose sight of the detrimental effect of being labeled as "fail-
ing" the honesty test. The stigma associated with being an individual at high
risk to commit dishonest acts is devastating to job seekers. To compound
this, there does not exist a protection to prevent the disclosure of this highly
confidential information to others.
Donald H. Stone, Pre-Employment Inquiries: Drug Testing, Alcohol Screening, Physical
Exams, Honesty Testing, Genetics Screening: Do They Discriminate? An Empirical Study,
25 AKRON L. REv. 367, 403 (1991). Obviously, the possibility of dissemination of damag-
ing test results among employers puts the job seeker at significant risk of long-term
unemployment.
229. Hanson, supra note 135, at 525. Conversely, applicants for management positions
tend to undergo more traditional and far more personalized screening procedures. Id.
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to have the effect of perpetuating-if not exacerbating-social inequal-
ity. Honesty testing, after all, essentially represents a probabilistic num-
bers game, attractive because it entails minor expenditures of time and
money, but imprecise because a significant proportion of those identified
as high-risk employees have been erroneously eliminated from the appli-
cant pool. Whereas the risks entailed in integrity testing are low for the
employer (who must only ensure that a sufficiently large sample of appli-
cants is available), the risks for the individual worker are substantial. Yet,
those wrongly stigmatized will be least likely to alter the outcome be-
cause, as unemployed, unskilled workers, they will constitute a class of
persons marked by political powerlessness and social marginality. They
will prove most vulnerable to stigmatization and least able to defend
themselves against abuse.
A third problem is that reliance on honesty testing invites abdication of
employers' responsibility for minimizing workplace deviance. Honesty
testing, by focusing on the elimination of "bad apples," implies that the
blame for employee theft must be placed primarily, if not entirely, at the
feet of the individual "deviant" employee; it fails to acknowledge that
counterproductive behavior also constitutes the product of organizational
culture, and hence is most effectively corrected by addressing institutional
needs. Employers should be encouraged to analyze situational factors
that either foster or deter employee theft and dishonesty and to study
means of improving organizational climate, labor-management rapport,
and employee morale.
Finally, although it is unlikely that the judiciary will determine that
honesty testing violates the constitutional right to privacy, 230 integrity
tests "do implicate notions of individual dignity and ethical concerns
which could inspire legislative action."'231 While honesty tests may be
perceived as less intrusive than polygraph examinations or certain psy-
chological tests, they nevertheless require that candidates reveal private,
innermost thoughts. Test evaluators, moreover, use test takers' responses
to draw conclusions regarding fundamental aspects of the latters' charac-
ter and personal integrity. These ethical concerns underscore the need
for regulation, if not prohibition, of integrity testing as a means of em-
ployee screening.
VII. PROPOSALS FOR REGULATION
A. THE NEED FOR REGULATION
With only two exceptions, every state continues to place control the
manner and conditions for use of honesty tests as an employee screening
device solidly within the hands of the employer. The resultant reliance on
corporate self-regulation is problematic for several reasons. On one
hand, it clearly effects a shift of bargaining power in favor of the em-
230. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
231. Hanson, supra note 135, at 525-26.
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ployer, as it permits companies singlehandedly to determine the contours
and boundaries of employee privacy rights. On the other hand, it places
the entire burden of selecting and administering appropriate testing
methods on business, while leaving test publishers free to develop and
market their products without any supervision. Test publishers have no
legal obligation to validate their tests, and their products are rarely
screened for compliance with privacy or discrimination laws.232 Although
the Association of Personnel Test Publishers published its suggested
Model Guidelines for Preemployment Integrity Testing Programs in
1990,233 seeking to standardize many of the primary parameters for hon-
esty testing, compliance with these guidelines is optional and in practice
varies greatly.234
In the absence of licensing requirements for published integrity tests,
and given the fact that test developers are free to keep their scoring
methods proprietary and inaccessible to peer review, the task of ensuring
legitimate, valid, and reliable testing methods rests squarely on the shoul-
ders of individual employers. Yet the majority of employers can scarcely
be expected to develop the kind of scientific expertise and resources that
would enable them successfully to evaluate the broad variety of tests that
are available on the market, or to become fully aware of the proper
method of interpreting test results.235 As a result, self-regulation often
amounts to no regulation, as employers may rely upon tests that lack
either scientific validity or the necessary guidance from test marketers to
enable users to employ test results in an appropriate manner. Unregu-
lated honesty testing not only has the potential of harming the interests of
232. Yamada, supra note 70, at 1578.
233. ASSOCIATION OF PERSONNEL TEST PUBLISHERS, MODEL GUIDELINES FOR PREEM-
PLOYMENT INTEGRITY TESTING PROGRAMS (1990). For a discussion of the standards es-
tablished by the Model Guidelines, see John W. Jones et al., Model Guidelines for
Preemployment Integrity Testing: An Overview, in PREEMPLOYMENT HONESTY TESTING,
supra note 135. The Model Guidelines were intended to be used jointly with other legal
and professional guidelines governing personnel selection methods. Id. at 245.
234. Yamada, supra note 70, at 1579. It is true that an increasing amount of validity
studies regarding different honesty tests has become available in recent years. See Ash,
supra note 4, at 10. Nonetheless, other publishers have conducted little, if any, research.
Yamada, supra, at 1578.
235. See Rudner, supra note 6, at 144. Rudner states that "it is doubtful that many
employers understand the conditions under which tests are useful, or that they properly
select and use assessment instruments." Id. Employers do not have easy access to non-
technical reviews, and there exist "no organizations dedicated to improving employment
testing practices.... Employers seeking objective, balanced information regarding techni-
cal, legal, and practical issues do not have a central source for information." Id.
Not all honesty test marketers, meanwhile, are entirely straightforward regarding the
quality and capabilities of their products. Frequent misrepresentations include claims that
a particular test (1) has been "fully validated"; (2) has correctly identified a large percent-
age of the people who were later found to be dishonest; (3) can screen out large numbers
of persons who are dishonest, even though their dishonesty cannot be demonstrated; (4) is
"EEOC approved"; (5) can predict violence; (6) or is not truly a psychological test and
hence does not require peer review. Robin Inwald, Those "Little White Lies" of Honesty
Test Vendors, PERSONNEL, June 1990, at 52. "Debunking" any one of these claims would




job seekers but may also fail to serve the goals of employers in selecting
desirable job candidates. Given the dearth of supervision of any kind
within the testing industry, strong reasons exist for enacting federal legis-
lation in order to impose some regulation upon the practice of honesty
testing.
B. PROHIBITION
There are compelling reasons for prohibiting paper-and-pencil honesty
testing altogether. First, a core consideration underlying Congress' deci-
sion to pass the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 was the fact
that polygraph examinations resulted in large numbers of misidentifica-
tions of purportedly "deceptive" employees. 236 Like polygraphs, integ-
rity tests entail substantial social costs because they tend to incorrectly
classify a significant number of persons as high-risk applicants, despite
the fact that these applicants will likely never engage in counterproduc-
tive behavior. As no ready and effective means of remedying this prob-
lem have been identified, only a complete ban on paper-and-pencil tests
can preserve the rights of individual workers and ensure that they will not
fall victim to mislabeling and stigmatization.237
A second reason for prohibiting the use of paper-and-pencil integrity
tests is that, like polygraph examinations, they are highly intrusive and
invade the privacy of job applicants. Indeed, some note that concern for
employee privacy and job security constituted the overarching factor
leading Congress to pass the EPPA.238 Although polygraph examinations
may in some sense be regarded as more intrusive than paper-and-pencil
tests because they involve physical invasion of the examinee's body in
order to probe his mental processes, this type of distinction is in many
ways more artificial than it is real.239 Whether by measuring physiologi-
cal changes or by subjecting examinees to a battery of questions seeking
236. S. REP. No. 284, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
726, 728-29. Not all of the reasons impelling the EPPA's ban on mechanical and electrical
types of honesty tests may be readily applied to paper-and-pencil tests. One core consider-
ation motivating Congress, for example, was the conspicuous lack of scientific research
demonstrating the efficacy of polygraph examinations as valid predictors of employee
theft. Id.; see also John W. Jones & William Terris, Selection Alternatives to the Preemploy-
ment Polygraph, in PREEMPLOYMENT HONESTY TESTING, supra note 135, at 39, 40-41. As
noted previously, more extensive-though still far from sufficient-research data are now
available regarding paper-and-pencil tests, and the general scientific consensus in favor of
rejecting polygraph examinations does not extend to the same degree to written integrity
tests. See Yamada, supra note 70, at 1580.
237. There are some indications that false positive rates may be reduced by re-screen-
ing those who tested positive during the first administration of an honesty test. See Scott L.
Martin, Honesty Testing: Estimating and Reducing the False Positive Rate, in PREEMPLOY-
MENT HONESTY TESTING, supra note 135, at 107, 109-110. It is unlikely, however, that
employers would go to the expense and trouble of re-testing low scorers rather than simply
to hire those who achieved high scores in the initial testing phase, or that they would be
able to disregard the fact that the re-tested candidate originally performed below standard.
The suggested solution is therefore unrealistic and does not solve the problem.
238. Hanson, supra note 135, at 520 (citing Terry M. Dworkin, Protecting Private Em-
ployees from Enhanced Monitoring, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 59, 65 (1990)).
239. See Decker, supra note 13, at 150.
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admissions of past conduct and exploring a variety of views and attitudes,
it is the goal of the examiner to elicit information-often of a highly per-
sonal nature-that would not otherwise be readily revealed by the ex-
aminee. This criticism is especially applicable to veiled-purpose tests,
which contain questions that are both personal and often lack any appar-
ent connection to the underlying issue.240 Just as the polygraph is intru-
sive because it deprives the subject of control over the content of his
responses,241 so too does the veiled-purpose integrity test, by concealing
from the test taker the true meaning of the questions asked, intrude upon
the individual's privacy by depriving him of conscious command over the
nature and implications of his answers. Moreover, overt honesty tests rob
the test taker of a significant measure of volitional control, both because
he is not truly free to refuse to answer 242 and because he is frequently
told that any untruthful answers given will immediately be detected. The
job applicant, then, has no option but to comply with the employer's de-
mand to reveal whatever information is sought by the test; his right to
privacy is irreparably compromised.
Despite the fact that public policy considerations seem to militate
strongly in favor of imposing a ban on the use of honesty tests, the APA
Task Force has spoken out against their prohibition, mainly because "to
do so would only invite alternative forms of pre-employment screening
that would be less open, scientific, and controllable. 2 43 This recommen-
dation, however, ignores the fact that none of the customary alternatives
(such as personal interviews, background checks, and references) are
comparable to honesty tests in the degree to which they invade the appli-
cant's private thoughts or threaten to permanently label the applicant as
dishonest.244 Furthermore, though they may prove less scientifically con-
trollable, traditional methods of pre-employment screening, in contrast to
honesty testing, are subject at least to some extent to various legal
restraints.2 45
240. Cf. H9BERT, supra note 1, § 7:06, at 24 (psychological tests, because of the per-
sonal nature of the questions asked, have been subject to privacy challenges).
241. Hanson, supra note 135, at 527. "[Olnce connected to the machine, a subject [is]
denied [the privilege of refusing to answer a given question]; in effect, the subject's physio-
logical response answers for him." Id.
242. An applicant's refusal to answer a question will earn the applicant a lowered score.
Id.
243. APA REPORT, supra note 28, at 26.
244. Unlike integrity tests, most other screening methods do not attempt to classify
applicants on the basis of honesty; therefore, no comparison in terms of erroneous classifi-
cation rates is possible. OTA REPORT, supra note 17, at 67.
245. See, e.g., IRA M. SHEPARD ET AL., WORKPLACE PRIVACY 123-33 (2d ed. 1989).
Significantly, some integrity tests may allow employers to obtain information that might
otherwise be legally protected from disclosure. For example, the Loss-Prevention Analysis
Test contains a scale for "financial security," intended to measure the amount of personal
financial pressure reported by the employee. See O'BANNON ET AL., supra note 7, at 144.
It is noteworthy that both the Federal Credit Reporting Act and Title VII (as well as many
state laws) place severe restrictions on an employer's ability to obtain financial information
regarding its employees by means of credit checks. See SHEPARD ET AL., supra, at 140-42.
By incorporating such information in an integrity test relying on employee self-reports,
some of these legal constraints may be circumvented.
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Given the APA Task Force's conclusions, and forceful attacks launched
against the OTA by both industry and certain sectors of the scientific
community in the wake of its report criticizing honesty testing,246 it is
doubtful whether a full-fledged proscription of integrity tests can become
reality. Yet, as the foregoing discussion has made clear, some regulation
of honesty tests is desperately needed, particularly as those most often
subject to honesty testing are among the politically most powerless and as
workable legal theories, under which those wronged by improper test ad-
ministration or evaluation might vindicate their rights, do not exist.247
C. AN ALTERNATIVE TO PROHIBITION: THE "HONESTY TESTING IN
EMPLOYMENT Acr"
Notwithstanding the troublesome social and legal implications of un-
regulated honesty testing, only two states have taken any steps to restrict
the use of integrity tests, and there are presently no indications that regu-
latory legislation is contemplated in any other states.248 Because the de-
velopment of industry regulation at the state level can thus be expected
to continue at an exceedingly slow pace and to result in a legislative
patchwork lacking uniform standards, this Comment suggests that regula-
tion is most appropriately undertaken through federal, rather than state,
legislation.249 Federal regulation has the advantage of setting clear guide-
lines for honesty test merchants. In addition, it may serve to ensure uni-
formity in the manner in which tests are administered and evaluated by
employers and thereby preserve the rights of test takers.
Any federal regulatory scheme should, at a minimum, include clear
standards for ensuring that tests meet all requisite validity and reliability
requirements. 250 Test publishers should be required to license their tests
with a designated regulatory agency,251 contingent upon compliance with
published test standards as recommended by the APA Task Force,252 such
246. See Hanson, supra note 135, at 519.
247. Yamada, supra note 70, at 1581-83.
248. See supra Part III.
249. In passing the EPPA, Congress similarly underscored the need for federal legisla-
tion by pointing out that inconsistent state laws governing polygraph examinations had
given rise to confusion among employees as to the nature of their rights and to frequent
circumvention of state standards by employers and polygraph examiners. S. REP. No. 284,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 726.
250. The APA Task Force identified lack of documentation and supportive research, as
well as test vendors' reluctance to make information regarding test development and scor-
ing available to the public, as its most serious concerns with regard to integrity tests. APA
REPORT, supra note 28, at 25-26. It strongly recommended that test publishers "prepare
manuals that provide a clear and detailed account of the development of each measure and
a summary of the evidence for its reliability and validity," and that they "make available to
qualified parties complete and detailed reports of research on their tests, including all neg-
ative findings." Id. at 26.
251. See Yamada, supra note 70, at 1584; Bemis, supra note 39, at 596 (suggesting that
test publishers be required to file tests with the appropriate state regulatory agency along
with statements of purpose and validation studies).
252. APA REPORT, supra note 28, at 9.
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as the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing253 and the
Principles for the Validation and Use of Personnel Selection Procedures.254
Most importantly, these regulatory standards mandate full disclosure of
all information necessary to permit peer review as well as of all relevant
research data.255 No test should be licensed that has not been demon-
strated, through independent research, to have predictive validity and re-
liability. Proprietary scoring keys should be prohibited. In order to
minimize the risk of error, federal regulation should additionally require
that all tests be administered and evaluated by professionals. 256
Not only should honesty tests meet basic scientific quality standards,
but, when used as pre-employment screening devices, they should also be
job-related. 257 This means that test vendors should clearly identify the
purposes for any given test and the particular behaviors that it is designed
to predict. Rather than allowing honesty test merchants to rely on vague
promises that a test will serve to eliminate potentially "counterproduc-
tive" or "high-risk" employees, vendors should be required to describe
with specificity the types of conduct the test seeks to identify. The partic-
ular behavior, in turn, should be directly linked to the job in question.
Thus, if a test's objective is to identify potential thieves, the position for
which the test is employed must be one in which employees in fact have
access to cash or merchandise and in which there exists substantial expo-
sure to theft loss. Where little opportunity for theft arises within the ac-
tual work environment, in contrast, integrity testing is unjustified and
should be proscribed.
Test users should be legally entitled to detailed and accurate informa-
tion regarding the specific constructs the test is designed to measure, the
types of work environments and applicant populations for which it is ap-
propriate, test limitations, and scientific evidence supporting test valid-
253. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (1985).
254. American Psychological Association, Division of Industrial-Organizational Psy-
chology, Principles for the Validation and Use of Personnel Selection Procedures, in Ro-
LAND T. RAMSAY, THE TESTING MANUAL: A GUIDE TO TEST ADMINISTRATION AND USE
(3d ed. 1987). The Model Guidelines for Preemployment Integrity Testing likewise contain
appropriate standards governing test development, selection and administration, scoring
and interpretation, confidentiality, and marketing. Jones, supra note 233, at 240.
255. APA REPORT, supra note 28, at 26.
256. There are indications that even slight variations in test administration can lead to
wide disparities in results. O'Bannon et al., for example, report that instructions given by a
particular store manager, who served as test administrator, which emphasized that test
takers should answer all questions honestly, gave rise to results that were seriously skewed
in relation to test results from other stores, because examinees took the instructions seri-
ously. O'BANNON ET AL., supra note 7, at 38. Subsequent omission of the word "honestly"
reportedly rectified the problem. Id. In view of the apparent sensitivity of test results to
such environmental factors, it is highly important that tests be administered in a standard-
ized and professional manner.
257. See Decker, supra note 13, at 150. "Standing alone, many of the questions that
appear on honesty tests would pose problems in any prospective job interview as unrelated
to the job." Id. at 146.
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ity.2 5 8 In addition, test publishers should provide training in test
administration and proper use of test results. 259
In order to reduce the significant potential for erroneous identification
of honest individuals as high-risk employees, the employer's reliance on
integrity test results should be restricted, and honesty testing should be
permitted only if test scores do not serve as the sole criterion for deciding
to reject or accept a job applicant, or for taking any other employment
action. Employers should, furthermore, be prohibited from using cutting
scores to separate those who "pass" an integrity test from those who
"fail." Test publishers should not be allowed to provide suggested cutting
scores.
260
According to the APA Task Force, the current dependence on cutting
scores is disturbing for a number of reasons: cutting scores frequently ap-
pear to have been set arbitrarily, without reference to any scientific prin-
ciples; they require compression of a continuous distribution of scores
into two values, which entails the loss of large amounts of highly impor-
tant information; any single test score is by nature inherently unreliable;
and it is questionable whether a single cutting score can usefully be ap-
plied in entirely different industries and businesses. 261 Test publishers,
therefore, should be prevented from imposing artificial cutoff points and
instead be encouraged to provide employers with overlapping ranges of
risks, combined with information about how these scores are to be inter-
preted jointly with other variables.262
Honesty testing of potential and actual employees should not be per-
mitted unless the informed consent of the test taker is first obtained. 263
While a valid argument can be made that an applicant's consent to hon-
esty testing is never entirely voluntary, since refusal to submit to testing
may seriously lessen his or her chances to be considered for the posi-
tion,264 at the very least the principle of informed consent should encom-
pass disclosure of the nature of the test and of its role in the employment
decision.265 In addition, examinees should be entitled to access to their
258. See Jones, supra note 233, at 240.
259. Id. at 241.
260. There is considerable consensus in the literature that arbitrarily set cutting scores
are at the base of the false positives problem and encourage employers to rely on honesty
tests "as litmus tests in the hiring process." Yamada, supra note 70, at 1585.
261. APA REPORT, supra note 28, at 19-20.
262. Id. at 20 n.4. The proposal to eliminate cutting scores differs from the standards
suggested by the Model Guidelines, which merely require test publishers to assist users in
establishing cutting scores. See Jones, supra note 233, at 243. Given the serious negative
implications entailed by the use of any cutting score, this Comment argues that only elimi-
nation of the practice as a whole can ensure fair results.
263. See OTA REPORT, supra note 17, at 76 (arguing that informed consent is basic to
the notion of fairness of a test or test procedures and is required by the Standards for
Educational and Psychological Testing).
264. Id. at 77.
265. Id. Bemis points out that this requirement would serve not only to alert test takers
to the test's significance but would also enable them to determine the reasons for their
rejection. Bemis, supra note 39, at 596.
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test results once they become available. 266 Rejected applicants should be
able to formally dispute questionable test results.
Finally, any legislation regulating the use of honesty tests should pro-
tect the privacy of test takers by mandating strict confidentiality of test
results. 267 Confidentiality is especially important under these circum-
stances because of the overwhelming danger that test takers with low
scores may become permanently stigmatized and unemployable. 268
Moreover, examinees are far less likely to give truthful responses to test
questions if they cannot be assured of confidentiality.2 69 One commenta-
tor has additionally suggested that the right to non-disclosure be made
non-waivable to prevent test publishers from circumventing confidential-
ity rules by incorporating standard waivers in their tests.270 Given the
great disparity in bargaining power between employers and job applicants
(who would most likely feel compelled to sign any requested waiver), this
approach seems preferable to the more lenient requirements of the Stan-
dards for Educational and Psychological Testing, which would permit re-
lease of test data with the informed consent of the test taker.271
266. See Yamada, supra note 70, at 1585. In contrast, O'Bannon et al. argue against
such disclosures. O'BANNON ET AL., supra note 7, at 40-41. The authors recommend, in-
stead, that the applicant not be given feedback on test results, because raw scores would be
meaningless, while interpretations of the results would cause candidates to "react nega-
tively." Id. In addition, they suggest that employers refer to the integrity test not as a
"test" but rather as a "survey" or "questionnaire" in order to reduce the likelihood that
applicants will perceive the test as threatening; that applicants not be told that they must
"pass" the test; and that the test results not be cited as a reason for rejecting an applicant
so that the potential for legal challenges may be minimized. Id. at 39-41. Although the
authors' recommendations may certainly be effective safeguards to protect the interests of
the employer, they are nevertheless troublesome. By encouraging secrecy, the authors ig-
nore the legal and ethical rights of the individual job seeker, who becomes the subject of
deception at the hands of the very persons who set out to test his honesty. Rather than
withholding critical information, test administrators should treat test takers with candor
and openness, particularly as no valid consent to submit to testing can be given if the test
taker has no understanding of either the purpose of the examination or the use to which
test results will be put.
267. The Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing provide:
Test results identified by the names of individual test takers should not be
released to any person or institution without the informed consent of the test
taker or an authorized representative unless otherwise required by law.
Scores of individuals identified by name should be made available only to
those with a legitimate, professional interest in particular cases.
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHO-
LOGICAL TESTING 85-86 (1985) (quoted in OTA REPORT, supra note 17, at 75). The Stan-
dards further state: "Test data maintained in data files should be adequately protected
from improper disclosure. Use of time-sharing networks, data banks, and other electronic
data processing systems should be restricted to situations in which confidentiality can be
reasonably assured." Id. at 76.
268. See SHEPARD ET AL., supra note 245, at 158.
269. Stone, supra note 228, at 403.
270. Yamada, supra note 70, at 1585.
271. See supra note 253.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, honesty testing in employment has become increasingly
popular in recent years. In 1989, shortly after Congress passed the EPPA,
O'Bannon et al. identified some forty-six different integrity tests mar-
keted to employers.2 72 Since that date, the demand for honesty tests has
increased dramatically. Yet, as the testing industry has grown, the pace of
research exploring the predictive validity of different honesty tests has
lagged well behind; and although it is true that significantly more re-
search data are now available than was the case a decade ago, results
remain inconclusive. The continued scientific debate is due not only to
the proprietary nature of some information and the persistent number of
flaws in early research designs, but also in large part to the fact that dif-
ferent test publishers tend to use rather divergent approaches and often
may measure quite different constructs.
Recent years, however, have seen more frequent publication of re-
search results, coupled with greater potential for peer review made possi-
ble by increased openness among test publishers regarding both test
development and scoring methods. Although the underlying validity is-
sues surrounding honesty tests may eventually be resolved, a more funda-
mental problem revolves around the policy implications and societal
consequences of integrity testing. The practice of testing employee hon-
esty solidly rests on the assumption, based in trait theory, that employ-
ment deviance is the product of individual character traits, and that the
selective elimination of undesirable traits will, in a manner reminiscent of
Social Darwinism, lead to optimal workplace behavior. In this view, in-
tegrity test publishers function as the social equivalents of genetic engi-
neers, detecting and isolating faulty traits-and, thereby, faulty
workers-until only desirable characteristics remain in the work force.
Yet, trait theory (the theoretical basis for integrity testing) has long been
the subject of substantial criticism within the psychological community.
The fact that reliance on honesty testing, with its emphasis on the assess-
ment of individual character, more often than not leads to a consideration
of the individual in isolation from his social environment is one of the
primary limitations on the utility of integrity tests. In contrast to the im-
plicit suggestions of honesty test vendors that personal predispositions
represent the primary source of workplace deviance, much relevant soci-
ological research indicates that employee theft is explainable only if
viewed in the full context of its institutional setting. Dishonesty may be
as much a management problem as it is one of personnel screening and
security.
Because of the intrusive nature of honesty testing and its serious poten-
tial for systematic misclassification, this Comment advocates prohibition
of integrity tests in most workplace situations. Even if integrity tests con-
tinue to play a role in the employee selection process, however, employ-
272. O'BANNON ET AL., supra note 7, at 8.
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ers must be reminded of their own role in preventing counterproductive
conduct through fostering a work environment that encourages coopera-
tion, loyalty, and honesty. Only by focusing on the interaction of organi-
zational culture with personal predispositions may problems of workplace
deviance be managed effectively.
